VALUES AND ATTITUDES
OF KURDS'21

KURDISH
STUDIES
CENTER

VALUES AND ATTITUDES
OF KURDS
2021

RESEARCH TEAM

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The field research of the project was conducted by **Rawest Research**.

Contents

Executive Abstract

Kurds are Muslims, Libertarians and Democrats

Identities such as Muslim, Libertarian, Religious and Democrat stand out among the participants. While Muslim, Religious, Conservative identities are more embraced by AKP voters, Libertarian, Muslim and Kurdish rights defender identities are predominantly visible in HDP voters. Kurdish nationalism seems to be prominent in the 10% band among Kurds. In the case of the Kurds who vote for CHP, Secular and Liberal emphasis stands out and distinguishes them from other groups.

Life Satisfaction is Low

The Kurds clearly differ from the rest of Turkey when it comes to life satisfaction. More than half of the participants share that they have low life satisfaction. Those who are live in the region, in small cities, men and young population make up the groups that are less satisfied with life. Household incomes of the participants are low and their households are more crowded than Turkey's average. The majority of the participants are in the low-income group.

Religiosity is still strong in Kurds

Religiosity has positive meanings in the perception of more than two-thirds of the participants. The rate of those who describe religiosity with negative connotations is around 10%. Positive concepts such as "goodness", "morality", "spirituality" stand out as examples while negative concepts are such as "unnecessity", "bigotry" and "oppression". Religiousness of HDP voters is not low contrary to the popular belief. Political views on religious practices do not differ significantly. More than four-fifths of HDP voters pray regularly or infrequently. The proportion of those who regularly pray is close to each other for HDP and AKP voters (44% to 50%). Even though the rates are close, HDP and CHP voters have a significant dominance in those who do not practice at all, or those who have practiced before, but reduced/quitted over time.

It is seen that those who position themselves in the group of non-religious are largely composed of those on the left of the political scale and HDP voters. The proportion of men in this group is more than twice that of women.

Attitudes differ according to gender, political opinion and immigration experience

In terms of values and attitudes, the Kurds stand out as having high political and social similarities with the rest of Turkey. Issues such as worldview, political tendency, immigration and sometimes gender stand out as the main factors that distinguish Kurds from each other. The economy is a common problem for almost all participants. If we look at the points where the Kurds diverge within themselves, while the Kurds living in the region and the West agree on issues such as education and the justice system, those living in the region also highlight women's issues and the Kurdish issue in addition to these.

Participants see the Kurds ahead of the Turks and themselves ahead of both communities in terms of all universal and moral values such as hard work, hospitality, benevolence, honesty and environmentalism. The reproaches against the "corruption" in the society and especially the change of young people are also widely

shared. The view that young people's morals are deteriorating is supported by 87% of those who live in small cities. Although this rate decreases in the Kurds living in the West, it is accepted as 65% in total.

Considering the gender perceptions of the participants, it is understood that although there is a relatively liberal attitude towards women, traditional stereotypes also maintain their strong influence. Compared to Turkish society, the Kurds have a more liberal approach in terms of gender issues. The groups that have this tendency are those who see themselves mostly on the left and HDP voters. Those who see themselves on the right and AKP voters consider that men and women are not equal, and the authority should belong to men, mostly based on traditional and religious grounds.

In addition, it is seen that the phenomenon of migration is an important factor influencing the experiences of Kurds and that a "more Turkish" Kurdishness is constructed, which is also shaped by "migrated generations". Agendas, demands and identification forms of Kurds living in the west of Turkey and planning a future there are gradually changing. This situation differentiates the Kurds in the West from the Kurds in the Region.

Generations Differ From Each Other

The educational level gap between Kurds and their parents sets them apart from the rest of Turkey. The gap between the education levels of the participants and the education levels of their parents is wider. On the other hand, children of parents with a high level of education also positively differentiate from others. When it comes to the age of marriage of the participants, it is seen that single people differ greatly from both married and parents. The age deemed appropriate for marriage by single people is 8 years older compared to married participants and 10 years older compared to their parents.

Most of the participants identify themselves as Muslim/Sunni/Shafi'i. Although their parents are religious, some participants state that they are not as religious and do not perform prayers as their parents. In this respect, it can be said that religiosity differs compared to the previous generation and a change has occurred in line with a more rational understanding.

Positioning in Center and Right is More Predominant

Results of the research falsify the assumption that the majority of Kurds position themselves on the left of the political spectrum. Most Kurds position themselves not on the left, but in the Center (47,2%). Although the majority outside the Center is positioned on the Left (31,2%), a significant portion (21,4%) also positions itself on the Right. While positioning on the right and left is one of the main factors affecting the differences in attitudes, as expected, the existence of common denominators among these different worldviews draws attention among the Kurds in terms of approach towards values.

For religious participants, religious view functions as a determining factor in political choices. As a manifestation of this, there is a strong acceptance among religious-conservatives from the rightist point of view that the leftists are "distanced from religion". This image of the left may determine the distance to the left and the closeness to the right among religious conservatives.

Political-national fears of partition and external threats, one of the prominent elements which define the rightist/conservative point of view, also seem to find a response in right-wing/conservative Kurdish participants. A significant portion of the participants (28%) think that "Jews rule the world", "Zionists have their eyes on these lands" and that there are external threats against Turkey. Such fears seem to be weaker in participants close to the left.

Nationalism Trends Differ from Turkey in General

Nationalism as a phenomenon bears negative connotations in majority of the participants. It is understood that this approach is related to the "Pan-islamism" or leftist internationalist worldview for some participants, while it is related to understanding and experiencing Turkish nationalism as an exclusionary form of nationalism. In this respect, understanding nationalism in a dominant and exclusionary form can reveal a distant attitude to this phenomenon.

However, when a more concrete context such as Kurdish nationalism is adopted, a loosening in this negative sense is evident. In this case, participants consider Kurdish nationalism as relatively more acceptable because they attribute a meaning that does not exclude other identities and claims rights. In this context, about one-third of the participants consider themselves to be Kurdish nationalists at a high level. While two-thirds of HDP voters embrace Kurdish nationalism at a medium or high level, nearly half of AKP voters adopt this identity.

Perception of Inequality is Strong

Majority of the participants think that Kurds and Turks are not equal before the state. While AKP voters have the opinion that inequality has decreased from past to present, HDP voters have a strong perception of inequality in terms of economy and identity. While less than a quarter of AKP voters share that there is no equality, this rate is more than half for CHP voters and more than three quarters for HDP voters. Similarly, this opinion is shared by one-third of the rightists and three-quarters of the leftists.

Participants refer to the solution process as a period when inequalities decreased, and both Kurds and Turkish society were "relieved". For this reason, support for the solution process turns into an attitude that cuts all participants horizontally, as is the case with the issue of mother tongue.

Common Demand: Mother Tongue

The most frequently emphasized problem and demand for the Kurdish issue by the participants is the mother tongue. Mother tongue stands out as the common demand of all Kurds with different views. Again, the most important issue regarding the perception of inequality is the mother tongue. Some participants think that Kurdish should be taught as the language of education and teaching while others think that it should be taught as an elective course. It is also emphasized that this issue cannot be resolved unless the employment problem is resolved even if Kurdish becomes the language of education and teaching. Again, participants largely agree on demands such as public service and education in mother tongue. Those who position themselves both on the right, in the center and on the left, or in another categorization, also those who are from the AKP, HDP and CHP state that they support these demands.

Voter Behaviors

The parties most supported by the participants are HDP and AKP. CHP ranks third. When we look the changes in voting preferences compared to 2018, it is seen that AKP and MHP lost votes while parties such as CHP, Deva and Gelecek increased their votes. HDP votes are also partially decreasing.

If the party with which they are close does not participate in the elections, half of the participants boycott or withdraw to their indecisive positions instead of voting for the second party. CHP and MHP stand out as second party preferences. HDP voters prefer the CHP option while AKP voters prefer MHP. Deva Party is the third party option of AKP voters. It seems that the AKP lost 16% of its votes and at least 11% of this point switched to the opposition. On the other hand, the votes transferred from CHP and HDP cannot balance AKP's loss of approximately 5 points. For those who did not vote in 2018 and will vote for the first time, AKP falls behind CHP. 4 out of 10 voters who did not vote tend to protest. This rate is around a quarter for first-time voters. Therefore, although the people who did not vote tend towards the opposition more, the motivation of this group to vote is still lower compared to others.

Selahattin Demirtaş is the politician deemed closest by the participants. Deniz Gezmiş follows him. Erdoğan ranks third among living politicians, and seventh overall. Süleyman Soylu and Devlet Bahçeli are the politicians that the participants see the most distant from themselves.

2.
Introduction

Since data such as ethnic affiliation and mother tongue spoken in Turkey are not taken into account in the census, statistical data on ethnic groups are usually generated by non-public studies. According to independent and reliable population projections, the Kurdish population in Turkey is estimated to be between 15 and 18 million.

However, the Kurds, who make up about 20 percent of Turkey's population, are mostly considered a homogeneous and political group. These stereotypes about the Kurds are of course generated with reference to the most visible political movement that represents them. This situation brings with it the positioning of the Kurds on the left of politics and therefore perceiving them as a group with strong leftist tendencies and values. Overlooking the fact that the Kurds, like the world and Turkish society, are changing, causes the evaluations about the Kurds to miss the current changes. The perception of the Kurdish public opinion as a monolithic, static and political group imprisons the analysis of them, their policy making processes and many other issues into customs and stereotypes.

The fact that the Kurdish issue in Turkey has followed a conflict-solution-conflict pattern in the last ten years and the heavy political atmosphere especially between 2015-18 has reduced the discussion and visibility of the Kurdish issue. Throughout this period, the Kurdish issue was discussed within a dilemma, in which the state was represented by the AKP and HDP was seen as the natural bearer of the issue. However, both the new policy of the CHP, the largest opposition party in Turkey, indicating signs of leaving the status quo in the Kurdish issue, and the HDP's supporting stance for this policy, as well as Kurdish issue policies of the DEVA and GELECEK parties that emerged from the AKP increased the interest towards the Kurdish issue and thus the Kurds.

Kurdish Studies Center started its studies in 2019 as an organization that aims to recognize the Kurdish society through insider information and to promote it in a way that includes its heterogeneity. This study, supported by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung Association Turkey Representative Office and field interviews conducted by Rawest Research, aims to better understand the political, cultural and social tendencies and attitudes of the Kurdish society. In this period where the Kurds are on the focus of the politics, getting to know the Kurds better, understanding their values and attitudes, and seeing the plurality closely will also serve a function that facilitates and supports both intra- and inter-communal dialogue and communication. We would like to thank our supporter who made this study possible and all our colleagues who devotedly put in their efforts to produce an excellent study.

3.

Methodology

The project was carried out on the basis of an exploratory and descriptive study and with a mixed methodology combining qualitative and quantitative data collection methods. In this context, firstly, data were collected through desk work followed by qualitative and quantitative field work.

The research was carried out in 11 provinces in total. The research was divided into two groups on a large scale, namely Region and West, and these two groups were divided into two groups within themselves. The provinces in the region are divided into core and periphery, while the western provinces are divided into close migration and distant migration provinces. In addition, the research was carried out in both metropolitan and non-metropolitan provinces in order to compare the cities with smaller regions. Thus, a study was designed in 9 provinces, 5 of which are metropolitans from the region known as the Kurdish provinces, and 2 provinces in the west of Turkey. In the study, a three-stage research process consisting of exploratory desk work, qualitative and quantitative techniques was applied.

WEST	Distant migration City	Metropolitan	İSTANBUL
WEST	Close Migration City	Metropolitan	ADANA
REGION	Core	Metropolitan	DİYARBAKIR
REGION	Core	Metropolitan	MARDİN
REGION	Core	Metropolitan	VAN
REGION	Core	Small city	AĞRI
REGION	Core	Small city	BİNGÖL
REGION	Core	Small city	HAKKARİ
REGION	Periphery	Metropolitan	URFA
REGION	Periphery	Metropolitan	MALATYA
REGION	Periphery	Small city	ADIYAMAN

3.1. Exploratory Study

In order to develop hypotheses about the socio-political and socio-cultural values and attitudes of the Kurds in Turkey and to have an inclusive research design, a literature search was made in the world and in Turkey regarding the categorizations containing right-left-center tendencies, and the axes of the research were attempted to be determined. In this context, preliminary interviews were conducted with Kurdish people from different political and social circles, and the preparations of the study were discussed with a group of relevant experts to obtain their contributions. The research design was made by clarifying the categories related to the values and attitudes of the Kurds, social and political life practices, consistency and differences between the identities and attitudes.

3.2. Quantitative Research

In the quantitative research phase, a total of 1369 people in the 11 cities mentioned above were interviewed face-to-face and the questionnaires prepared within the scope of the research were applied. The Kurdish population density in these cities has been established by using various population projections, TURKSTAT data and different studies conducted to date. The sample of the study represents the population of the research in these provinces with a margin of error of ±2.65 and a confidence interval of 95 percent. The distribution of the sample is as follows.

	NUMBER OF SURVEYS	PERCENTAGE
İSTANBUL	164	%12
ADANA	97	%7
DİYARBAKIR	228	%16
MARDİN	92	%7
VAN	144	%10
AĞRI	68	%5
BİNGÖL	102	%7
HAKKARİ	87	%6
URFA	217	%16
MALATYA	91	%7
ADIYAMAN	79	%6

3.3. Qualitative Research

In the qualitative research stage, in-depth interviews were conducted with 50 people based on different variables such as province, age group, gender, socio-economic status, and political opinion. It has been attempted to understand the daily life practices of the Kurds and the background of the values and attitudes they adopt while exhibiting these practices. It focused on the sources of experience and information in the formation of opinions about Right and Left worldviews, and determined the points where these values and attitudes were similar and different both with the Turkish public opinion and with each other. In-depth data on identity construction processes, their attitudes and judgments towards each other, and how they are interpreted these were collected at this phase.

4.

Demography, Educational Status, Employment

When we look at the demographic data of the participants, it can be seen that there are significant differences between the young people and the previous generation, but at the same time they also differ from the rest of Turkey.

For example, when the household density is considered, it is seen that the household density is over 4,8 among the participants. This density changes under middle age and decreases to below 4. This means that single people largely continue to live with their families, and married people of middle age and younger have fewer children. Considering that the average household size in Turkey is 3,4 according to TURKSTAT data, it is seen that although the household density of Kurds has decreased, it is still above the average of Turkey.

There is a wide gap between educational levels of the participants and their parents. 82% of the mothers and 65% of the fathers have had primary school education or lower levels. This rate is 21% for the participants. While the total rate of those who have completed secondary and high school is 30% for fathers and 15% for mothers, this rate is 43% for the participants. The difference between the participants and their parents widens considerably for higher education level. Among the participants, the rate of those whose mothers are graduates of higher education is 3% while this rate is 6% for fathers. Whereas, this rate is more than one-third (36%) for the participants when we look at the total of university graduates and university students.

EDUCATIONAL LEVELS

	Low	Average	High
Father	65	30	6
Mother	82	15	3
Self	21	43	36

Although the educational data separates the participants from their parents, the employment data does not appear to be optimistic. 42% of respondents are currently employed, however, three-quarters of them are unskilled wage earners.

EMPLOYMENT STATUS

	EMPLOYED			UNEMPLOYED		
Unqualified Employee	Qualified Employee	Tradesman etc.	Jobless	Housewife	Student	Retired
29	7	6	17	22	13	5

However, a closer look at this table reveals that women are in a disadvantaged position, both in education and employment data. Three out of every four employed people are men and only one is woman. The situation is almost the opposite for those who are neither in education nor in employment. Four out of five people in this group are women while only one is man. When we look at those who have retired from employment, a significant predominance of men can be observed.

	IN EDUCATION			IN EMPLOYMENT			RETIRED		
TOTAL	27%			43%			5%		
WOMEN		11%			24%			1%	
MEN			15%			60%			10%

TOTAL WOMEN MEN

4.1.Identities and Values

Two dominant identities of the participants are Muslim and Libertarian. These are followed by Religious and Democrat identities in parallel. Kurdish rights advocacy and Kurdish nationalism are owned by more than 10%.

WORLDVIEW

Identity	Percentage
Muslim	41%
Libertarian	36%
Religious	19%
Democrat	18%
Conservative	13%
Kurdish rights advocate	13%
Kurdish Nationalist	10%
Social Democrat	9%
Leftist	9%
Socialist	8%
Secular	7%
Rightist	6%
Turkish Nationalist	6%
Liberal	5%

The identity or worldview of the participants also differs in relation to their political party preferences. While three out of every five AKP voters emphasize their Muslim identity, this emphasis is less than one third among HDP voters and less than one fifth among CHP voters. Libertarianism, on the other hand, is preferred by almost half of HDP and CHP voters, and less than one-fifth of AKP voters. A similar clustering is seen in terms of emphasis on democracy. This emphasis is above 20% in HDP and CHP, and below 10% in AKP voters. HDP voters emphasize Kurdish rights advocacy and Kurdish nationalism. While 21% of HDP voters highlight their identities as Kurdish rights advocates and 17% as Kurdish nationalists, these two identities are seen at a rate of 4-5% among AKP and CHP voters. The most evident emphasis that distinguishes CHP voters from others is secularism. While this rate is 5% for HDP and AKP voters, it is one fourth for CHP. A similar disintegration can be seen in terms of liberal identity. While this emphasis is 3% for AKP voters and 1% for HDP voters, it differs with CHP voters with 14%.

	GENERAL	AKP	CHP	HDP
Muslim	41%	61%	17%	29%
Libertarian	36%	18%	47%	47%
Religious	19%	33%	4%	11%
Democrat	18%	9%	22%	21%
Conservative	13%	26%	6%	5%
Kurdish rights advocate	13%	4%	4%	21%
Kurdish Nationalist	10%	4%	5%	17%
Social Democrat	9%	5%	11%	12%
Leftist	9%	1%	24%	12%
Socialist	8%	3%	15%	11%
Secular	7%	5%	24%	5%
Rightist	6%	15%	4%	1%
Turkish Nationalist	6%	10%	5%	3%
Liberal	5%	5%	14%	3%

When asked about adopting some of these identities, a graph like the one below appears. Participants find themselves as women's rights advocates and environmentalists, with a score of 7 on a scale of 1 to 10. These are followed by religiosity and social democracy. The arithmetic average of Kurdish nationalism is 4,8, while Kemalism is adopted by 3,9 percent.

Women's Rights Advocate	7.1
Environmentalist	6.9
Religious	5.7
Social Democrat	5.6
Conservative	5.0
Kurdish Nationalist	4.8
Leftist	4.6
Kemalist	3.9
Rightist	3.6

If we take a closer look at some groups, we can see that remarkable findings stand out: for example; 23% of religious people state that they are extreme Kurdish nationalist. 3 out of 10 HDP voters and 2 out of every AKP voter share this view.

While half of the AKP voters are highly religious, this rate is one-fifth among HDP voters. One-tenth of the AKP voters are religious on a low level while nearly half of HDP voters share that view.

While a quarter of AKP voters emphasize that they are conservative on a low level, 12% of HDP voters consider themselves highly conservative. The emphasize on Kemalism is evident in AKP and CHP voters. Three quarters of HDP voters emphasize Kemalism at a low level.

This situation tells us that conservatism and religiosity clusters are not politically homogeneous. On the other hand, it is seen that Kurdish nationalism is embraced to a considerable extent among religious people.

		GENERAL	AKP	CHP	HDP
Religiosity	Low	0%	10%	40%	44%
	Average	33%	40%	47%	37%
	High	67%	50%	13%	19%
Kurdish Nationalism	Low	46%	52%	40%	36%
	Average	31%	28%	46%	34%
	High	23%	20%	14%	30%
Social Democracy	Low	46%	37%	24%	30%
	Average	31%	35%	46%	42%
	High	23%	29%	31%	28%
Kemalism	Low	62%	48%	36%	72%
	Average	24%	27%	24%	20%
	High	14%	25%	40%	8%
Conservatism	Low	26%	15%	51%	54%
	Average	37%	41%	38%	34%
	High	38%	43%	11%	12%
Women's Rights Advocacy	Low	16%	15%	11%	14%
	Average	36%	42%	30%	37%
	High	47%	42%	60%	49%

When the participants compare themselves, Kurds and Turkish society in terms of certain characteristics, we see that they give themselves higher scores in all subjects. In other words, the participants see themselves as more hardworking, more generous, more peaceful, giving more importance to the family and moral values than the Kurds and Turkish society in general. However, when we look at the generalizations of the Kurds and Turkish society, they consider the Kurds to be in a more positive place than Turkish society for each adjective. According to the participants, the adjectives with which the gaps between Kurds and Turkish society are the most distant are being peaceful, hospitality, generosity and attaching importance to family. The adjective that the participants gave themselves the highest score and the one they gave the lowest score to the Turkish society is the same: the value attached to women.

| TO WHAT EXTENT SOME CHARACTERISTICS ARE APPLICABLE FOR TURKISH SOCIETY, KURDS AND THEMSELVES (1-5)	HARDWORKING	HELPFUL	HOSPITABLE	GENEROUS	PEACEFUL	TRUSTWORTHY	MERCIFUL	CONSCIOUS	HONEST	ATTACHING IMPORTANCE TO FAMILY	ATTACHING IMPORTANCE TO MORAL VALUES	ATTACHING VALUE TO WOMEN	ENVIRONMENTALIST
Turkey	2,8	2,9	3,1	2,8	2,7	2,7	2,9	2,6	2,6	3,0	3,0	2,5	2,6
Kurds	3,2	3,6	3,9	3,5	3,5	3,3	3,5	3,1	3,2	3,7	3,6	3,1	3,0
Themselves	3,8	4,1	4,1	4,0	4,0	4,0	4,1	3,8	4,0	4,1	4,0	4,2	3,9

5.

Sociocultural Tendencies And Preferences

5.1.Life Satisfaction

The Kurds clearly differ from the rest of Turkey when it comes to life satisfaction. More than half of the participants share that they have low life satisfaction. The average of the scores given by all participants is 3,8 out of 10. In studies conducted across Turkey[1], this rate is around 5,4.

When the factors affecting life satisfaction in Turkey are examined, it is seen that Kurdish provinces are subject to a significant inequality. For instance, in the Socio-Economic Development Index (SEGE) study prepared by Ministry of Industry and Technology in 2017 at the latest and which includes numerous factors, almost all of the 20 provinces with the lowest score are Kurdish provinces.[2] According to 2021 Life Satisfaction Survey of TURKSTAT[3], the provinces with highest life satisfaction are Isparta and Batman while Diyarbakır, Tunceli and Urfa rank the lowest.

Against, when we take a look at wellness state which is one of the important factors affecting happiness, the happiest province is Afyon (84,3%) while the unhappiest province is Mardin (52,7%).

Therefore, the fact that all indicators, from employment to education, from health to social life, are far below Turkey's average also affects the level of life satisfaction.

LIFE SATISFACTION

INCOME LEVELS

■ Very Low ■ Low ■ Average ■ High

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
[1] Data for Turkey in general which we compare the findings in some sections of the report are obtained from the data of Turkey researches of Social Impact Research Center – TEAM unless otherwise specified. See teamarastirma.com.
[2] For a more detailed reading on SEGE and Kurdish provinces, see. Inequality Bulletin https://www.getrevue.co/profile/EsitsizlikBulteni/issues/esitsizlik-bulteni-neden-nasil-ne-zaman-970062
[3] The happiest and unhappiest cities of Turkey: https://www.mynet.com/turkiye-nin-en-mutlu-ve-en-mutsuz-sehirleri-hangileridir-en-mutlu-sehir-neresi-110106910582

LIFE SATISFACTION

	Low	Average	High
TURKEY	34%	40%	36%
SAMPLE	56%	38%	6%

■ Low　■ Average　■ High

When we compare satisfaction levels with Turkey scale, while the people with low life satisfaction in Turkey are about one-third (34,1%), more than half of the research participants share low satisfaction (56,4%) according to TEAM data. Again, the people with high life satisfaction in Turkey in general are more than one-third (35,8%), however, this rate is dramatically low in participants who are all Kurds (6%).

41 out of every 100 people participating in the research declare their household income below 3 thousand TRY. Just as many say that they have a household income of between 3 thousand and 5 thousand TRY. The rate of those whose household income is above 5 thousand TRY is 19%.

It is also seen that socio-economic status is closely related to life satisfaction. Only 6% of those with a low income are highly satisfied with their life, while this rate is 21% for those with a high income.

				LEVEL OF INCOME		
			GENERAL	Low	Average	High
LIFE SATISFACTION	Low		56%	67%	47%	49%
	Average		38%	28%	49%	30%
	High		6%	5%	4%	21%

When the groups are examined closely, it is seen that men are less satisfied with life than women, young people are less satisfied than other age groups, single people are less satisfied than married people and HDP voters are less satisfied than AKP voters. On the other hand, those with high levels of religiosity and conservatism and those with strong tribal affiliation have higher life satisfaction than others.

LIFE SATISFACTION (1-10)

GENERAL	WOMEN	MEN	YOUNG	MIDDLE AGED	ADVANCED AGE	MARRIED	SINGLE	LESS RELIGIOUS	VERY RELIGIOUS	RIGHTIST	LEFTIST	AKP	CHP	HDP
3,8	3,9	3,7	3,5	3,8	4,2	4,3	3,3	2,8	4,3	4,8	2,8	5,1	3,6	3,1

5.1.Problems, Worries and Dreams

The economy is a common problem for almost all participants. According to the participants, education is Turkey's top priority problem after the economy. About half of the participants agree on this. The problem of education is at the top of the list of almost all participant groups, including AKP voters, conservatives and A Haber viewers. Education is followed by the justice system, women's issues and the Kurdish issue. Freedom of expression and the immigration problem are also seen by 21% of the respondents as urgent problems required to be solved.

TURKEY'S TWO MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS OTHER THAN THE ECONOMY

| Problem	%
Education	49%
Justice system	41%
Women's issues	36%
Kurdish question	28%
Freedom of expression	21%
Immigrant issue	21%
Social peace	18%
Corruption	18%
Agriculture	14%
Environmental issues	13%
Distancing of young people from religion	13%
Media	11%
Industrialization	10%
Presidential system	10%
Technological backwardness	8%
Unplanned Urbanization	7%
External affairs	6%

It is a striking result that women's issues are seen as one of the urgent problems to be solved by one third of the participants. However, the fact that the Kurdish issue is mentioned by more than a quarter of the participants indicates that this issue has become one of the priority topics of the agenda after a long time.

If we look at the points where the groups diverge, while those living in the region and the West agree on issues such as education and the justice system, those living in the region also highlight women's issues and the Kurdish issue in addition to these. Media and Corruption seem to be prominent problems among Kurds living in the West. Again, it is understood that AKP voters consider the immigration problem and the distancing of young people from religion as a significant problem.

As the reason why the top priority problems are topics such as economy, education and justice, the participants mostly state that the economic welfare, education system, justice and freedoms have worsened in Turkey in the last 10 years

WORSENING

Economic welfare of society	69%
Education system	69%
Justice system	68%
Freedoms	61%

5.2.Family, Marriage, Divorce

When we look at the marriage age of the participants and their parents, there is an evident difference between generations. The average age of marriage of the mothers of the participants was 19 while this was 22 for fathers. However, considering the age at which single people are considering marriage, the distance between them and their families widens.

Mother's marriage age	19
Father's marriage age	22
Marriage age of married people	23
Age at which single people consider getting married	31

Nearly half of the participants describe the family as the most important value. This is followed by justice and morality by a third. Honor is seen as the most important value for more than one-fifth of the participants.

Family	44%
Justice	37%
Morality	35%
Honesty	28%
Trust	25%
Honor	22%
Prestige	16%
Money	14%
Love	13%
Spirituality	12%
Kinship	7%
Friendship	7%
Reputation	7%
Neighborhood	4%
Status	4%

When the meanings attributed by the participants to certain concepts are examined, it is seen that the views on these concepts coincide with the general acceptances in the society. Family evokes togetherness, peace and happiness while motherhood and fatherhood also have parallel connotations with gender roles. Motherhood is sacred, difficult and beautiful while the term mother evokes compassionate and self-sacrificing connotations for the participants. Fatherhood, on the other hand, corresponds to expressions such as household responsibilities and head of the family. However, when we look at the concepts of men and women, the connotations that overlap with motherhood are repeated for femininity while masculinity bears negative connotations such as dominance apart from the concept of fatherhood.

CONNOTATION OF WORDS

FAMILY	MASCULINITY	FEMININITY	MOTHERHOOD	FATHERHOOD	HONOR
Togetherness	Power	Difficulty	Sacred	Responsibility	Honor
Peace	Earning a living for the household	Mother	Self-sacrifice	Providing livelihood	Important
Family members	Being a man	Beauty	Mercy	Protecting	Morality
Happiness	Protecting	Love	Love	Self-sacrifice	Family
Life	Domination	Effort	Compassion	Supportive	Feminine
Love	Responsibility	Strong	Difficulty	Pillar of the family	Essential
Trust	Unnecessary	Housewife	Responsibility	Trusting	Chastity
Home	Pride	Sacred	Having children	Difficulty	Gender
Solidarity	Courage	Being oppressed	Beautiful	Sacred	Meaningless

When the views of the participants on the issue of family and marriage are reviewed, the views that regard the institution of family and marriage as "sacred", associate it with human nature and consider it as a fundamentally religious necessity is predominant. In this regard, women compared to men, those on the center and right compared to those on the left, those with strong religiosity compared to those who with less religiosity, those living in small cities compared to those living in big cities, and AKP voters compared to other voters consider marriage more sacred.

MARRIAGE IS A SACRED INSTITUTION	TOTAL	62%
GENDER	Women	65%
	Men	59%
MARITAL STATUS	Married	68%
	Single	58%
POLITICAL TENDENCY	Left	55%
	Center	64%
	Right	66%
RELIGIOSITY	Low	47%
	High	71%
CITY	Metropolitan	56%
	Small City	75%
VOTING PREFERENCE	AKP	70%
	CHP	66%
	HDP	58%

When we look at the qualitative interview data on this matter, it is thought that the family, and therefore marriage, has a functionality in terms of social order as well as in terms of religion. Marriage, in particular, is considered by certain conservative participants as a necessary and compulsory institution, as it provides a legitimate basis for sexual needs of humans, protects them from bad behavior, and enables the continuation of the generation. In this context, while men are uncomfortable with the increase in the age of marriage, women mostly find it positive as they think that it is more appropriate to marry at a more mature age. On the other hand, there are some participants who say that marriage is not a must.

> *"Family is the necessary institution for the continuation of the generation. It is the place where the child is born, this place must be powerful. The woman must have a strong role here. Marriage is also natural. We all have a natural inclination: men to women, women to men. Instead of doing it in illegitimate ways, which creates trouble, it should be done in legitimate ways and I think it is mandatory"* (Male, Teacher, Tatvan, age 47).

> *"Family is essential in our life. It is what directs our lives, educates us, forms our character, creates our belief, teaches us how to live, and continues our lineage. (…) [Marriage] is absolutely necessary. Marriage is a must according to the law of nature. It is necessary for the continuation of the generation. Marriage is necessary for the continuation of the family and human needs. It is the duty given to us by Islam"* (Male, Tradesman, Van, age 43).

> *"Yes, it is necessary. Every person wants another person with whom they can share the same house in their life. Loneliness is only for God."* (Female, Teacher, Diyarbakır, age 30)

> *"It is necessary. Humans are creatures that cannot live alone. It would be good for people to be among a structure based on love. Family is an element that supports this. It is better than dying alone."* (Female, Employed, Istanbul, age 42)

> *"As I am a religious person, yes, it is necessary. If I want to be with someone of the opposite sex, the first condition is marriage. But there are people who do not prefer this, and this is their decision. It is necessary for the religious, it is not necessary for the non-religious, and it is even more logical that it is not."* (Female, Student, Istanbul, age 22)

Majority of conservative male participants seem to have a traditional approach to family and marriage. Some participants describe marriage and family as a field in which men dominate/should dominate based on both religious and traditional grounds.

> *"Family is sacred because God says your spouses are entrusted to you, protect them."* (Male, Civil Servant, Van, age 47).

> *"Head of the family [man] is the shepherd of the family."* (Male, Imam, Diyarbakır, age 48).

> *"It is sacred because I look at it from a religious point of view. Our spouses and children are entrusted to us. Head of the family is the man."* (Male, Civil Servant, Van, 40).

Another question answered by the participants is about the divorce issue. The views we have quoted and commented on the necessity and sanctity of marriage and family actually reveal some clues about how the participants view the issue of divorce. The dissolution of marriage, which is considered as a sacred institution, is naturally regarded as a dangerous act that works against sanctity. Participants approach this issue through religious and traditional contexts, similar to marriage and family issues.

Considering the views on divorce and the protection of the family; it is understood that women give more importance to the protection of the family and are more opposed to divorce compared to men, those who are more religious than those who are less religious, those who live in small cities than those who live in big cities, and AKP voters compared to CHP and HDP voters.

THE STATE MUST DEVELOP MEASURES SUPPORTING THE FAMILY IN ORDER TO REDUCE DIVORCES

	TOTAL	58%
GENDER	Women	61%
	Men	56%
MARITAL STATUS	Married	62%
	Single	56%
POLITICAL TENDENCY	Left	51%
	Center	64%
	Right	61%
RELIGIOSITY	Low	42%
	High	62%
CITY	Metropolitan	52%
	Small City	72%
VOTING PREFERENCE	AKP	69%
	CHP	51%
	HDP	52%

Again, when we look at the qualitative data, it can be seen that the most frequently used expressions on the issue of divorce by conservative participants are "the situation that God made halal but disliked the most", "catastrophic", "harmful", "dangerous", "something cursed by the religion". These expressions are used by male participants, who think that "women are given too many rights" and describe divorce on the basis of women's weaknesses:

> *"Women have been given too many rights and they abuse it" (Male, Barber, Tatvan, age 45).*

> *"Laws protecting women need to be revised. It was good to get rid of the Istanbul Convention." (Male, Imam, Diyarbakır, age 48).*

> *"The family has a very important place in society. Children and individuals create everything in the family. Therefore, breaking it up is obviously bad." (Female, Student, Istanbul, age 22)*

Still, almost all of the participants think that couples who cannot work out should get a divorce in the final stage:

> *"They should get divorced if they cannot make it work and there is no other way" (Male, Imam, Urfa, age 36)*
>
> *"It should be tried, forced, but it should end if it does not work. It is dangerous after that. Divorce is necessary if it really does not work out" (Female, Secretary, İzmir, age 45).*
>
> *"If there is a problem, it should be discussed. There must be an effort to find a solution. But if there is no solution, it must end" (Female, Housewife, Istanbul, age 36).*

Regarding flirt, dating, and premarital relationships, right/conservative participants present their views on religious and traditional legitimacy domain. In general, there are opinions that it is legitimate and necessary to meet for the purpose of getting to know each other before marriage, however, extramarital affairs and intimacy beyond this are wrong.

> *"We look at it from the Islamic point of view. There is no such thing as flirting in Islam. if a person is going to get married, they should meet and talk a few times in accordance with Islam, but they should not go on vacations, stay in the same house, or satisfy sexual feelings, which we call flirting today. This situation leads to divorce in marriages." (Male, Imam, Urfa, age 36).*
>
> *"I see it as heresy. I think there should be talks before marriage, but there should be limits. Talks should be conducted to learn basic conditions." (Male, Civil Servant, Van, age 47).*
>
> *"I think it should be, after all, two people will share one life. Therefore, the period of dating and engagement should be a short one. It is an important time to get to know each other." (Male, Musician, Diyarbakır, age 25).*
>
> *"It is necessary to get to know each other. To know what kind of a person they are. You need to know that you are compatible. It must be for the purpose of marriage." (Male, Merchant, Muş, age 40).*
>
> *"It is not good for a person to not see the woman they are going to get married. The meetings should be decent." (Male, Tradesman, Bingöl, age 63).*
>
> *"There should be a meeting within a halal limits. One should get to know the other person, definitely." (Female, Accountant, Istanbul, age 44).*

> *"Flirting or dating is okay. People can date, meet, get along, or break up if they are not compatible." (Female, Employed, Istanbul, age 46).*

Almost all of the conservative participants in the qualitative interviews do not approve of relationships such as flirting, extramarital affairs, and people sharing the same house without marriage. While there are different views on holding hands during flirting and premarital dating, there is an acceptance that practices such as kissing and sexual intercourse are wrong. Here, too, it is seen that religion and traditional culture integrated with religion constitute the source of legitimacy regarding the boundaries of the relationship.

> *"I do not find it right. I approach this in a religious context. Our religion does not allow such things." (Female, Accountant, Istanbul, age 44).*
>
> *"They have to be to a certain extent. Because, irreparable consequences occur. Meeting is permitted. Others are dangerous, inconvenient. It is also wrong in terms of religion." (Male, Retired Teacher, Adıyaman, age 70)..*

ABORTION SHOULD BE BANNED	Total	Gender						City		Tribal Connection	
		Women	Men	RIGHT	LEFT	AKP	HDP	Large	Small	Weak	Strong
Yes	33%	34%	33%	54%	23%	47%	26%	32%	36%	34%	51%
Indecisive	25%	23%	26%	22%	23%	27%	21%	28%	17%	15%	21%
No	42%	43%	42%	24%	54%	26%	53%	40%	47%	51%	28%

One-third of respondents argue that abortion should be banned. Those who are hesitant or indecisive about expressing an opinion on this matter are also one-fourth. The rate of those who are against the banning of abortion is 42%. There does not appear to be a factor separating men and women in the abortion issue. On the other hand, those who position themselves on the right of the political spectrum, AKP voters and those with strong tribal connections, give higher support to the banning of abortion.

In the group with high opposition to abortion, the views on the issue of abortion are mostly that abortion is against Islam and that a living creature in the womb cannot be killed. One out of every four people who position themselves on the left and HDP voters are against abortion. The opposition is discussed on religious and cultural grounds in this group. However, there are those who explain the right to life of the creature in the mother's womb with reference to human rights other than religious references.

In these groups, abortion is thought to be possible only if there is a situation that threatens the mother's health. Although there is no clear distinction between men and women regarding abortion, the qualitative interviews present examples that women are more moderate compared to men due to the relation of this issue with experience of womanhood.

"Abortion is a sin in terms of religion. You cause a person to die. It becomes alive upon conception. I don't find it right to kill it. It should be banned completely." (Male, Accountant, Van, age 26).

"Abortion can be allowed if it harms the mother of if there is a risk of death. But it is absolutely haram to abort it based on the grounds of unintentional acts. You are ignoring the will of God." (Male, Imam, Urfa, age 36).

"The state should ban abortion except for illness and rape cases. I consider it religiously and socially." (Female, Student, Istanbul, age 22)

"It can be allowed if the mother's life is in danger or if the child has died in the womb. Other than that, it is not right. There are consequences of killing a living being, therefore I am against abortion except in such cases." (Female, Teacher, Diyarbakır, age 30)

"The cause is important. It can be a last resort if the woman's health is at risk and she really is not able to take care of it. Since it is the woman who will give birth, carry it in her belly and suffer, this right [priority in decision making] should belong to women more." (Female, Employed, Istanbul, age 44)

5.3.Approach to Lifestyles and Changes

Libertarian attitudes of the participants on issues such as gender and freedom of belief stand out. While nearly half of the participants say that women can go out whenever they want, 45% support the recognition of djemevis as places of worship. 41% agree that religion courses should be elective.

In addition, more than one third of the participants emphasize that they would not prefer to eat in restaurants serving alcohol, that people belonging to the Islamic religion are superior in the eyes of God, and that the justice system should be compatible with Islamic rules. On the other hand, it is seen that the support for the sharia-based state remains at 16%. More than a quarter of the respondents think that there is no need for the principle of secularism in the constitution

.

	TOTAL	RIGHT	LEFT	AKP	HDP
Women can go out whenever they want	48%	49%	59%	42%	48%
Djemevis should be recognized as places of worship	45%	44%	51%	42%	51%
Religious courses must be elective instead of compulsory	41%	38%	49%	38%	47%
I do not want to eat in restaurants serving alcohol	38%	53%	25%	53%	31%
People who belong to the religion of Islam are more acceptable in the eyes of the God.	37%	52%	28%	49%	25%
The justice system must be compatible with Islamic rules	36%	52%	29%	47%	29%
There is no need for the principle of secularism in the constitution	27%	33%	23%	33%	26%
I would want a sharia-based religious state to be founded in Turkey.	16%	34%	11%	25%	8%

If we take a closer look at these data, it is noteworthy that 38% of the participants who position themselves on the right and AKP voters think that religion courses should be elective. Again, the preference of not wanting to eat in restaurants serving alcohol is predominant in those who see themselves on the right and AKP voters. Another remarkable fact is that this attitude is supported by a quarter of those who see themselves on the left and by 31% of HDP voters. A similar situation is observed when it comes to the compliance of the justice system with Islamic rules. While almost half of those who position themselves on the right and AKP voters support this view, more than a quarter of HDP voters and those who position themselves on the left support it. Finally, the idea of establishing a sharia-based state is supported by 11% of those who position themselves on the left and 8% of HDP voters.

The reproaches against the "corruption" in the society and especially the change of young people is also widely common. The view that young people's morals are deteriorating is supported by 87% of those who live in small cities. Although this rate decreases towards the West, it is accepted as 65% in total.

	TOTAL	RELIGIOUS	BIG CITY	SMALL CITY
Young people's morals	65%	71%	55%	87%
Prestige of religious people	53%	53%	47%	65%

In the light of the qualitative data, it can be said that the participants with right/conservative view have a higher concern about the socio-cultural changes experienced in the Kurdish society. In these views, there is a concern that traditions and customs cannot be transferred to the younger generation, that the power of family ties and religion is weakened, and therefore there a corruption is experienced.

"There is a change. I am worried that it is getting worse. In the past, the Kurds were a more humane, hospitable, helpful society. It is increasingly integrated into the West." (Male, Teacher, Urfa, age 36).

"You have come to this day on a tradition for 200 years, but you have been experiencing important problems in the last century. The values that made you the person you are were values from the past, it is concerning that these do not continue" (Male, Teacher, Tatvan, age 47).

Although some participants see change as a normal and a necessity of the age, the majority of especially right/conservative participants think that the Kurdish leftist movement had negative effects on this change.

"It is concerning, the reason for the change is politics. The Kurdish left is turning the youth away from religion." (Male, Worker, Van, age 39).

"I am very upset about this. There has been an assimilation in the Kurdish society due to the state and conditions of modernism. This changed the lives of the Kurds. Now they are becoming secular and materialist, thinking mundanely, completely rejecting their traditions and customs. The Kurdish left has 100% impact on the reasons for this change." (Male, Civil Servant, Van, age 47).

"Kurds love religion, but it upsets me that they are moving away from it. It is because marginal groups and leftists influence the youth with independence and freedom promises." (Male, Imam, Diyarbakır, age 48).

> *"The modern world also has an impact. The world is changing, so Kurdish traditions are also changing." (Male, Lawyer, Diyarbakır, age 29).*
>
> *"It is certain that they the youth is experiencing a change, regardless of whether they are Kurdish or Turkish. We see an erosion taking place in the youth of both sides. Everyone started to look alike, because with the effect of the internet, the world started to become closer to each other, and when all cultures became similar, it caused young people to change and resemble each other (Female, Accountant, Istanbul, age 44).*
>
> *"There are positive and negative aspects. As with any subject, there is corruption. There is a situation that we call pleasure and speed in the world, it is also evident in Kurdish youth." (Male, Imam, Adıyaman, age 59).*
>
> *"Popular culture is more influential than the left." (Male, Civil Servant, Van, age 30).*

5.4.Approaches to Gender

Considering the gender perceptions of the participants, it is understood that although there is a relatively liberal attitude towards women, traditional stereotypes also maintain their strong influence. While nearly half of the participants defend that women can go out whenever they want, the rate of those who argue that abortion should be banned is one-third. However, more than a third of respondents think homosexuality is a disease, and one quarter support prioritizing men in employment.

These views of the participants are not of a homogeneous character. In particular, factors such as gender, left and right of the political spectrum, political party affiliation and tribal connection seem to be associated with these approaches. For example, 54% of those who position themselves on the right argue that abortion should be banned while this rate is 23% for those on the left. This difference is similar in the approaches of AKP and HDP voters. Again, 44% of those who position themselves on the right argue that men should be prioritized in employment while this view is supported by 16% of those position themselves on the left. Again, while one-fourth of those on the left support the view that homosexuality is a disease, this rate doubles among right-wing participants. A similar difference is also observed in the priority of university education. Here, the opinion that men should be given priority is supported by 8% of the leftists, while it reaches one-third among the rightists. There is also a difference in approach between whether the city is large or small and whether the connection with the tribe are weak or strong.

		Gender	
	Total	Women	Men
Abortion should be banned	33%	34%	33%
If there is a shortage of employment somewhere, men should be given priority	25%	22%	28%
If a family member will go to university, the boy should be prioritized	16%	13%	18%
Female and male students can stay in the same house	27%	24%	30%
Women can go out whenever they want	48%	54%	42%
Homosexuality is a disease	39%	43%	35%
A man should be seen as tough in the eyes of those around him	32%	27%	38%

	RIGHT	LEFT	AKP	HDP	City		Tribal Connection	
					Large	Small	Weak	Strong
Abortion should be banned	54%	23%	47%	26%	32%	36%	34%	51%
If there is a shortage of employment somewhere, men should be given priority	44%	16%	35%	18%	24%	26%	24%	38%
If a family member will go to university, the boy should be prioritized	33%	8%	21%	11%	17%	13%	17%	25%
Women can go out whenever they want	49%	59%	42%	48%	51%	41%	59%	44%
Homosexuality is a disease	51%	24%	51%	33%	31%	55%	41%	44%
A man should be seen as tough in the eyes of those around him	42%	28%	38%	27%	32%	34%	26%	49%

Marriage is a sacred institution	3,7
The state must develop measures supporting the family in order to reduce divorces	3,6
Women should be able to go out whenever they want	3,4
Homosexuality is a disease	2,9
Abortion should be banned	2,8
A man should be seen as tough in the eyes of those around him.	2,8
Female and male students can stay in the same house.	2,6
If there is a shortage of employment somewhere, men should be given priority.	2,5
If a family member will go to university, the boy should be prioritized.	2,2

It is seen that the qualitative data on the perception of gender are in line with the abovementioned views. Views of the qualitative participants, who are predominantly from the right/conservative worldview, on the issue of gender are also in line with a heteronormative worldview where women and men are not equal, mainly based on traditional and religious grounds. Participants think that there is predominantly no equality in terms gender equality and that the authority should belong to men. These views are based on religious and traditional grounds, especially with concepts such as "creation", and justify gender inequality based on a historical and social basis. In short, although the participants think that religion gives equal rights to men and women and that these two genders are equal in the eyes of the God, it can be easily seen that this idea of equality turns into inequality in social relations and daily life. For example, when we look at the views in this context, the answers are that men should have the right to speak and authority, women should get permission from their husbands in matters such as travel/clothing/work, that women are more emotional than men due to their nature, and that they should work in professions suitable for them.

> *"Women must obtain permission from men, the man is decisive. The religious necessity for a Muslim woman is clear. It is clearly stated in the Qur'an. The responsibilities and*

jobs of men and women are different, and they are not equal in nature." (Male, Civil Servant, Van, age 40).

"Women and men should know their limits. Even if the woman works, she should wash the dishes at home and not argue with her husband. She can do anything as long as it is within the Islamic framework." (Male, Imam, Diyarbakır, age 48).

"The woman will know her femininity, give birth and take care of her house. The man will provide for his household. They will perpetuate their generation. Men and women are not biologically equal, their duties are not the same." (Male, Tradesman, Van, age 43).

"They are not equal, but complete each other. They are equal in terms of personal rights. I find it appropriate that while men should provide for the household while women should take care of housework and children. My religion determines my opinion. They should take responsibility at different issues in terms of authority, but the final decision should be made by the man as the head of the family. The reason for this is that women are more emotional and decisions should be left to men" (Female, Teacher, Diyarbakır, age 30).

"There must be an authority, and there must be a man in the house. Men are naturally inclined towards this. Let us say the woman is a housewife, she needs to take care of the housework, and the man needs to know the value of this. Men and women should live by knowing their responsibilities. Men and women are legally equal. Theft is a crime whether committed by a woman or a man, however, they are not biologically equal. The God gave the women the duty of housework and birth due to nature. Men must work." (Male, Imam, Urfa, age 36).

"I think that men and women are equal in the eyes of the God, but I think that they should not be equal in terms of life. The man should be at the forefront in the society and the family." (Male, Worker, Van, age 39).

"They cannot be equal. The fact that women have undertaken the duty of being the head of the household has increased the number of divorces. They rely too much on their economic freedom, therefore a lot of problems arise. They exchanged roles. Men should always dominate." (Male, Merchant, Muş, age 40).

"Men are superior. Physically and religiously. Me and my wife are both working and we also contribute to the household economy, so we are equal at home. However, I do not want women to come to the fore, the head of the house is the man. She should ask for permission, she can't go anywhere." (Male, Barber, Tatvan, age 45).

As can be seen above, the views that men are superior in terms of the issue of gender are mostly expressed by men. Opinions of female participants may differ at this point and may be in the direction of gender equality.

"They should be equal, but they are not. A woman has to carry herself and does not need a man's approval." (Female, Teacher, Diyarbakır, age 24).

> *"Of course, they are equal. However, I think that there should be a little more positive discrimination for women. You are working… you will also clean, cook, take care of the children in the home, be present in the business world. All of these are tiring jobs. Roles must be shared in this tiring situation." (Female, Public Relations Expert, Istanbul, age 42).*

> *"They should be equal. If working women have children, their working hours should be less." (Female, Housewife, Istanbul, age 36).*

Considering the opinions about whether women can work or in which professions they can work, especially male participants think that women should take care of children at home, and even if they work, it is appropriate for them to work in jobs suitable for women and in places where women are predominant, for example in kindergartens, schools or healthcare field. Moreover, the number of those who have negative opinions about women being a director or manager is high among male participants. Female participants think that women can work in any profession.

> *"They can work in any profession" (Female, Teacher, Diyarbakır, age 24).*

> *"Women can work in any environment where they feel comfortable." (Female, Accountant, Istanbul, age 44).*

> *"They can work in any job. I know a 20-year-old woman who went to Africa, worked in the mines and now is an industrial giant. They can do anything." (Female, Public Relations Expert, Istanbul, age 42).*

> *"It is great for a woman to work. I wish the state would provide facilitating opportunities for women with children. It is wonderful that women have economic freedom." (Female, Housewife, Istanbul, age 36).*

> *"If a woman has studied, worked hard, she can work as long as the environment is appropriate. They can work in environments where women are predominant and in public institutions such as hospitals." (Male, Worker, Van, age 39).*

> *"It is more appropriate for a woman to take care of children at home, but if she has to work outside, she has to work according to Islam. Men and women should not work together." (Male, Imam, Urfa, age 36).*

> *"Not every job is for women. They should be nurses and teachers. Otherwise the family order would disrupt. When the mother works, the children stay away from the family and live away from that love." (Male, Merchant, Muş, age 40).*

The responses given to the question we asked about the Istanbul Convention, which can be considered a current issue regarding the women's issue, are in line with the views stated above. In the responses given to the question, the view that the said contract does not comply with Islam and the cultural structure of the society is predominant among the conservative and/or right-wing participants, together with the scarcity of those who have in-depth knowledge of the contents of the convention:

"I know that it has been repealed, and I see this as positive. Illegal situations would be allowed under the name of women's rights. (Male, Contractor, Bingöl, age 42).

"It ended the concept of family. I do not know the exact contents. Divorces have tripled since its entry into force. If you give a woman more rights than necessary, she will victimize the man at the point of property division. It will be a disaster for the society if you make the woman economically superior. That way, small arguments would lead to divorces." Male, Teacher, Urfa, age 36).

"I heard about the contract, there was a sympathy towards LGBTs, they wanted to legitimize this. If this is the case, I am against it." (Male, Tradesman, Van, age 43).

"It is completely against us and our religion, Islam.The people who will determine our family structure are not the current society. They literally oppress men as well under the name of protecting women, there are articles that will cause families to break down." (Male, Imam, Urfa, age 35).

"I heard about it, I think that the Istanbul Convention does not protect the family unity and the family structure. Istanbul Convention encourages situations such as the deterioration of family unity, increase in divorces, and women's desire to live alone. It is against religion. A more suitable convention can be applied instead of Istanbul Convention in an Islamic country." (Male, Worker, Van, age 39).

"It is completely disgusting although I do not know the exact contents. For example, the issue about lesbians or the rights acquired by women themselves cause more harm to women rather than protecting them. It is disgusting for reasons such as adultery being no longer a crime. With my Muslim identity, I do not see it appropriate as it will disrupt the social structure." (Male, Civil Servant, Van, age 40).

"I think of it negatively. Homosexuality and extramarital marriage are encouraged. It is disturbing that it is on legal grounds." (Male, Teacher, Van, age 40).

It is seen that unlike the male participants, female participants have an attitude in favor of the convention in this regard:

"The only convention that protects women legally. It is not right to repeal it. If we are talking about the Istanbul convention so much, it means that there is nothing in Turkey that would protect women. Even if there is, it is not implemented." (Female, Secretary, İzmir, age 44).

"I've heard of it, but haven't read its contents. However, I think it is an important convention if women are claiming it." (Female, Accountant, Istanbul, age 44).

"It should not have been repealed. Everyone associated it to LGBT, however, nobody considered the rights of the women who were killed. Basic rights should be more important than LGBT rights. LGBT issue is between them and God, but the other is a basic right." (Female, Teacher, Istanbul, age 24).

> *"I did not have the opportunity to read it in detail, but it was positive for me. I do not think it was right to repeal it. Women in Turkey have lived through difficulties, in that sense, it can make things more difficult." (Female, Employed, Istanbul, age 46)*

In the section about what the participants think about LGBTI individuals, how they view the visibility of individuals with this identity in their cities or neighborhoods, how they consider the rights, laws and marriages of homosexuals, although some participants consider the issue as rights and laws of the people with these identities or within the framework of "normality", majority of the participants consider it as a "disease", "heresy" and an issue that corrupts the morals of the society.

> *"Our religion considers it as a disease. It needs to be treated." (Male, Worker, Van, age 35).*
>
> *"I see it as an obsession, a disease" (Male, Contractor, Bingöl, age 42).*
>
> *"I am against it. I see it as a disease." (Male, Civil Servant, Bingöl, age 40).*
>
> *"I think it is a sick thought. I consider the rest as heresy except for biological cases." (Male, Civil Servant, Van, age 47).*
>
> *"It can be cured if it is essentially a disease. If it is not a disease, it is a cursed condition for me. Tribes were perished for this cause. It is heresy for me." (Male, Civil Servant, Van, age 40).*
>
> *"I am against it. We saw the tribe of Lot. These people are perverted. The state should not give them a chance." (Male, Imam, Diyarbakır, age 48).*
>
> *"Our religion has expressed its stance towards this situation very clearly. But, I am against the use of violence. This is why I do not see it positively." (Female, Teacher, Diyarbakır, age 30).*
>
> *"I have no sympathy for them. I think most of them have mental disorders. I think that the events they experienced in their childhood led them in this direction. There may also be those who are born that way biologically. But I think most of them should be treated."(Female, Accountant, Istanbul, age 44).*
>
> *"If there is a congenital disease, it is treated. They can choose treatment. They should be rehabilitated." (Male, Retired Teacher, Adıyaman, age 70).*
>
> *"Bad. It is immoral and a disease. (Male, Tradesman, Muş, age?).*
>
> *"It is an ugly thing. It is something against nature. They may not be Muslims, but it is against the nature. Even animals do not have this condition." (Male, Imam, Urfa, age 36).*

In addition to the "disease" and "heresy" comments regarding the LGBTI issue, there are also approaches that this orientation is not suitable for "here". Based on the acceptance that the Kurdish society has a culture dominated by religion and that this culture is based on a binary gender regime, the LGBTI issue is considered as a perversion that does not belong to "here", its roots are external, and spread to this society through propaganda.

"We have to oppose. Otherwise we'd lose our honor. It is a European disease." (Male, Imam, Diyarbakır, age 48).

"May God show them the right them. I see it as both anti-religious and heretical. We can say that homosexuality is the order of people who want to create a new world order. There are some social diseases, it is something like that." (Male, Engineer, Van, age 38).

"I see the language of politics and what happens on social media that supports and normalizes this as an operation of perception." (Male, Merchant, Muş, age 46).

6.

Religion and Religiosity

For more than two-thirds of respondents, religiosity has positive connotations. The rate of those who describe religiosity with negative connotations is around 10%. Positive concepts such as "goodness", "morality", "spirituality" stand out as examples while negative concepts are such as "unnecessity", "bigotry" and "oppression".

BEING RELIGIOUS	
Good	7%
Religion	6%
Islam	6%
Religious	6%
Necessity	5%
Belief	4%
Praying	4%
Abusing religion	3%
Morality	3%
Spirituality	3%
Bigotry	2%
Being a servant	2%
Islam	2%
Loyalty	2%
Praying (Salaat)	1%

Hanafi	33,7%
Shafi'i	54,1%
Other	5,0%
I do not have a religious belief	7,2%

More than half of the participants in the quantitative research belong to the Shafi'i sect. The proportion of those who belong to the Hanafi sect is one-third. 5% of the participants belong to beliefs such as Alevi, Caferi, Christian, and 7,2% do not have any religious beliefs.

Looking closely at the table, it is seen that those who position themselves in the group of non-religious are largely composed of those on the left of the political scale and HDP voters. The proportion of men in this group is more than twice that of women. 4% of the participants who voted for the AK Party in 2018 also share that they do not have a religious belief.

	TOTAL	RIGHT	LEFT	AKP	CHP	HDP
Hanafi	33,7%	58%	19%	57%	47%	17%
Shafi'i	54,1%	39%	62%	38%	44%	65%
Other	5,0%	2%	4%	1%	3%	4%
I do not have a religious belief	7,2%	1%	12%	4%	5%	11%

	TOTAL	Women	Men	RIGHT	LEFT	AKP	CHP	HDP
I do not believe in God	5,6%	3%	8%	1%	11%	4%	4%	10%
I do not believe that there is a way to know the existence of God.	3,9%	2%	6%	3%	6%	2%	9%	4%
Sometimes I believe in the existence of God, sometimes I do not	4,5%	4%	5%	2%	8%	2%	11%	5%
Most of the time I feel like I believe in God	9,6%	9%	10%	5%	12%	5%	17%	10%
I know that God really exists, and I have no doubt about it.	76,4%	81%	72%	89%	63%	88%	60%	70%

It is seen that the majority of the participants pay attention to their prayers and they do not miss the fast, even if they sometimes miss their prayers. There are different answers regarding Friday prayers. Again, the majority of male participants state that they go to Friday prayers. However, some participants say that they do not attend Friday prayers because of their radical Islamic views in the past or because they are uncomfortable with the "political" and "nationalist" content of Friday sermons today.

> *"We used to not go to Friday prayers because of our Islamic view, we have been going to religious administration mosques for the last 10-15 years. (…) We decide that we do not need to be separated from the society too much" (Male, Teacher, Tatvan, age 47).*
>
> *"I do go. Even if I am uncomfortable with the sermons, I do." (Male, Civil Servant, Van, age 40).*
>
> *"Yes, but I go less frequently. It being overly political and reading nationalist texts negatively affect the frequency of my participation." (Male, Teacher, Van, age 40).*
>
> *"I do not go. I was participating until 2 years ago. I am not going because it is completely monopolized by the state and the religious affairs." (Male, Lawyer, Diyarbakır, age 29).*

In the qualitative interviews, it is seen that almost all of the religious participants come from religious/conservative families. Although their parents are religious, some participants state that they are not as religious and do not perform prayers as their parents. In the light of qualitative data in this respect, it can

be said that religiosity can differ compared to the previous generation and a change has occurred in line with a more rational understanding. Although the majority of the participants describe themselves as Muslim/Sunni and Shafi'i, some participants think that the sect is not very binding for them. It is possible to say that this approach is related to the development of a more rational and questioning understanding of religion, unlike the traditional understanding of religion of the parents' generation, with the generations receiving education and in the modern urban environment.

Whether they say they are more religious or less religious, it is seen that the rational understanding of religion brought about by modernization is effective in the changes experienced by the participants in this regard compared to previous generations.

"Respectful to religion, respectful to family, religious." (Male, Tradesman, Bingöl, age 63).

"It could be continuing the tradition. It is to pay attention to private and non-private environments. I see it as what should be positive."(Female, Teacher, Van, age 31).

"To embrace and protect our religious values. To be able to live it as much as possible and advise those around us. Inform them about these." (Female, Accountant, Istanbul, age 44).

"I do not see the word conservative in conformity with religion, so I am not conservative. It almost means that you do not talk about the religion, just learn about it and this is enough for you. Traditional. Religion should be in line with the word "read", it should be more reformist." (Male, Engineer, Van, age 38).

"Conservatism is being closed to newness and also closed to a new language in a religious and sociological sense. It is to be a group that is contented with ancestors and narrations." (Male, Retired, Diyarbakır, age 62).

"Conservatism is about a somewhat narrow mindset. It has strict rules and boundaries. This situation does not coincide with religion. This is how religion is often distorted." (Female, Teacher, Diyarbakır, age 24).

"We grew up with a traditional understanding of religion in the family, however, I learned more by reading and had conflicts with the traditional religion structure in the family. I blamed them, thinking that the traditional religious structure was rigorous and unrealistic towards religion. My religious thinking has changed and is still changing." (Male, Teacher, Van, age 40).

"I used to have an imitative understanding of religion, and then I had a firm faith by conducting researches." (Male, Imam, Urfa, age 36).

"[My religiosity] decreased due to social pressure. Speaking of political impact… I distanced myself from religion since what must have been done was not done in terms of law, justice." (Men, Tradesman, Muş,age 40).

It is seen that the practicing prayers is higher in women than in men, and it is inversely correlated with education level. When we look at those who are currently practicing prayers, this rate is 50% for AKP and 44% for HDP voters. However, HDP voters have a significant dominance in those who do not practice at all, or those who have practiced before, but reduced/quitted over time.

This shows that a significant part of HDP voters are also religious. On the other hand, there is a significant relationship between not having a religious belief and not praying or stopping practicing prayers and being HDP a voter compared to AKP voters.

						Education Level							
WHEN THE LAST TIME PRAYING	TOTAL	Women	Men	RIGHT	LEFT	Low	Average	High	Metropolitan	Small City	AKP	CHP	HDP
Active	44,5%	51%	38%	41%	32%	71%	36%	40%	39%	56%	50%	21%	44%
Loose	16,8%	16%	18%	31%	14%	14%	23%	11%	18%	14%	25%	20%	12%
Often	10,3%	9%	12%	8%	11%	2%	14%	11%	11%	9%	11%	12%	12%
Rare	14,2%	14%	14%	10%	21%	7%	14%	19%	16%	11%	9%	23%	15%
Cannot due to health reasons	14,2%	10%	18%	9%	22%	6%	14%	19%	16%	10%	4%	24%	18%

The religious/conservative participants interviewed at the qualitative stage stated that they mostly received religious education when they were children and that they have given/will give religious education to their children. Almost all of the answers given to the question we asked these participants about whether their family members are believers or not were that such a situation would be responded with an upset or reactive manner. Some participants state that if their children do not believe, they will react negatively, while others state that although they would not react, they will try to correct this situation which they see as a test, in more moderate ways.

"It makes me feel bad because of the parental responsibilities that religion has given me." (Male, Civil Servant, Van, age 47).

"I would be negatively affected if my child is not a believer. I am trying to make them as religious as I can, my child has tendencies for both religious and non-religious education. Assuming that my wife does not have such a choice after this time, I would definitely divorce. I would have a negative pressure. I had already clearly expressed my opinion on religion when I got married. We both agreed." (Male, Civil Servant, Van, age 40).

"I'd have a strong reaction. I'd try to change it." (Male, Civil Servant, Bingöl, age 40).

"It is a personal opinion for me. I do not force, but I'd make her/him read and talk about it so that she/he reaches the truth." (Male, Teacher, Urfa, age 36).

"It is a very painful situation. I do not want it to be like this, it will disrupt my psychology. I'd try to fix it." (Male, Merchant, Muş, age 46).

"For me it means the destruction of the world and suffering." (Male, Imam, Diyarbakır, age 48).

About half of the participants do not find any religious actors close to them. While this rate is over 50% for HDP voters, it is around one third for AKP voters. Looking at the actors who are deemed close, it is seen that the list consists of religious actors, who are mostly known through the media in Turkey. In this context, the most admired and sympathized person is Nihat Hatipoğlu. He is followed by Ömer Döngeloğlu and Mustafa Karataş. All three names are stated not only by AKP voters, but also by HDP voters, although not with the same density. The affinity of AKP voters to these names is more than twice the affinity of HDP voters.

56% of the women participating in the study wear a headscarf. It is seen that headscarf wearing is also related to age group, education level, religiosity and political opinion. As the age decreases, the rate of wearing a headscarf also decreases. Rate of wearing a headscarf in the 50+ age group is more than one and a half times that of young people. A similar difference can be observed between those with a low level of education and those with a high level of education. As the frequency of practicing prayer increases, the rate of wearing a headscarf also increases. 9% of those who have never prayed wear a headscarf.

While 71% of women who position themselves on the right are wearing headscarves while this rate is also substantial among those who see themselves on the left: 43%. Similarly, 81% of female AKP voter participants wear headscarves while a quarter of CHP voters and nearly half of HDP voters wear headscarves.

		Woman Wearing Headscarf
	TOTAL	56%
AGE GROUP	16-29	48%
	30-49	54%
	50+	74%
EDUCATION LEVEL	Low	77%
	Average	52%
	High	44%
RELIGIOSITY	Low	37%
	Average	56%
	High	71%
PRACTICING PRAYERS	Active	76%
	Loose	70%
	Often	50%
	Rare	26%
	Never practiced	9%
POLITICAL VIEW	Left	43%
	Right	71%
VOTING STATUS	AKP	81%
	CHP	26%
	HDP	44%

Headscarf has very strong connotations for spouses and fathers, especially from the right/conservative views. Some opinions point to a more moderate and cautionary approach while others point to a more oppressive position. Women seem to be more moderate in this regard.

"Women wear headscarf in my family, I reacted when my daughter took it off. She took off her headscarf at the age of 17, said 'this is my life', but I don't think it's her life, I said she was doing the wrong thing, not the right thing. I also pressured her, I said not to do it, but laws similar to Istanbul convention tied my hands for a while." (Male, Teacher, Tatvan, age 47).

"I object. If she insists, I will try to compromise. Religion cannot be practiced only with clothes." (Male, Merchant, Muş, age 40).

"I won't react too harshly to her decision, but I'll try to understand her. I would tell her that this is not right, but won't pressure if she insists." (Male, Imam, Adıyaman, age 59).

"I wouldn't interfere. It should be assessed based on the conditions of the time. Headscarf is not a necessity." (Male, Retired, Diyarbakır, age 63)

"My sister can take off her headscarf, it's her choice and I can't persuade her. I just talk. This would not ruin our relationship." (Female, Teacher, Diyarbakır, age 30)

"I went through this situation, I consider it normal. My mother and father were against it, but a person should act as however they feel comfortable and good. The individual should do what feels good." (Female, Istanbul, Housewife, age 36)

Some religious/conservative male participants say they would react harshly if someone in their family took off her headscarf. Accordingly, they state that if their spouse takes off her headscarf and insists on it, it will ultimately lead to divorce:

"I will not accept this. I will fight until the end. [If she insists on taking off her headscarf] I'll kick her out." (Male, Tradesman, Muş, age?).

"I will not accept this. For example, when I married my wife, she knew that I lived according to Islam and that I would have sensitivities about Islam. She accepted me this way, and she has no right not to accept me in the middle of the road." (Male, Imam, Urfa, age 36).

"I won't allow it. I would not react well. It wouldn't end well. We might part ways." (Male, Worker, Van, age 35).

"We'd divorce." (Male, Civil Servant, Bingöl, age 40).

"My reaction would be harsh if she takes off her headscarf, I would try to encourage her again." (Male, Civil Servant, Van, age 47).

"I definitely cannot let my wife take off her headscarf. "It would lead to divorce since we talked about this in the beginning." (Male, Civil Servant, Van, age 40).

"My wife and family wear headscarves. I'd try to warn, insist, persuade. But I might divorce if she is persistent. (Male, Contractor, Bingöl, age 42).

7.
Perception Of Media

As expected, the participants watch different TV channels as a manifestation of their political views. 28% of the participants do not watch TV while 7% do not follow the news on TV. Therefore, one-third are not interested by the news. The news channels watched also differ according to political views. The majority of those who watch the news on TV prefer Fox TV. Participants from all political tendencies prefer Fox TV, but the "opposition" predominate among them. In addition, Fox TV ranks the first among AKP voters and those who have rightist views. 49% of CHP voters, 34% of HDP voters and 17,7% of AKP voters watch the news on this channel. A Haber, ATV and TRT are the most preferred channels after Fox TV. The majority of those watching these channels are right-wing/conservative party voters. It is seen that other channels are also watched apart from these mainstream channels. Unlike other participants, 12,6% of HDP voters watch Sterk TV.

Which TV channel do you follow the news most	TOTAL	RIGHT	CENTER	LEFT	Religious	AKP	CHP	HDP
Fox TV	28,5%	29,0%	27,6%	28,7%	23,4%	17,7%	49,1%	33,7%
A Haber / ATV	9,2%	17,5%	6,0%	2,1%	16,0%	21,2%	7,4%	2,8%
TRT channels	6,3%	11,5%	3,2%	2,9%	10,1%	16,9%	3,5%	1,2%
Stêrk TV etc.	5,7%	3,1%	2,9%	10,8%	3,5%	0,9%	0,3%	12,6%
Habertürk	4,1%	6,4%	4,5%	1,1%	4,4%	7,1%	5,1%	1,4%
NTV	4,0%	3,6%	6,1%	2,8%	2,9%	6,4%	0,3%	3,2%
CNN Türk	2,0%	1,8%	2,0%	2,1%	1,2%	3,0%	0,4%	2,2%
Halk TV	1,6%	1,5%	1,8%	1,6%	2,2%	0,9%	2,5%	1,7%
Other	5,6%	4,3%	5,0%	7,6%	6,0%	4,7%	7,3%	7,0%
I don't watch TV	26,0%	17,1%	32,7%	30,9%	23,5%	15,9%	16,9%	28,5%
I don't follow the news on TV	7,1%	4,2%	8,2%	9,5%	6,6%	5,3%	7,5%	5,8%

Considering the data on trust in the media, the trust scores of the participants do not exceed 3 on a scale of 1 to 5. Fox TV stands out as the most trusted channel. It is followed by Halk TV and TRT channels. A Haber, Sözcü and AA stand out as the least trusted news channels by the participants.

TRUST IN MEDIA (1-5)

Channel	Score
FOX	2.9
HALK TV	2.6
TRT	2.5
NTV	2.5
HABER TÜRK	2.5
CNN TÜRK	2.4
AA	2.3
SÖZCÜ	2.3
A HABER	2.2

Channel	Distrusting	Neutral	Trusting
A Haber	59%	19%	22%
Sözcü	58%	26%	17%
AA	54%	25%	21%
CNN Türk	51%	27%	22%
HaberTürk	48%	29%	22%
NTV	48%	29%	22%
TRT	48%	26%	26%
Halk TV	48%	29%	22%
FOX TV	36%	24%	39%

■ Distrusting ■ Neutral ■ Trusting

41

RATE OF DISCONFIDENCE	TOTAL	Metropolitan	Small City	LEFT	CENTER	RIGHT	RELIGIOUS	AKP	CHP	HDP
Yeni Akit	61,0%	62%	58%	80%	60%	45%	64%	41%	59%	77%
A Haber	59,4%	60%	58%	81%	59%	41%	57%	27%	75%	81%
Anadolu Agency	54,0%	57%	48%	76%	49%	39%	57%	31%	61%	71%
CNN Türk	51,0%	53%	47%	66%	49%	40%	54%	37%	41%	60%
Haber Türk	48,4%	53%	39%	65%	49%	34%	52%	27%	45%	63%
NTV	48,4%	51%	42%	65%	48%	35%	52%	29%	50%	61%
Halk TV	48,2%	48%	49%	44%	50%	50%	56%	53%	32%	47%
TRT	48,0%	51%	42%	71%	46%	30%	45%	19%	53%	67%
FOX TV	36,4%	38%	33%	26%	39%	43%	50%	52%	13%	26%

Yeni Akit is the most untrusted media organizations. The group with the lowest distrust in Akit is those who see themselves on the right and the AKP voters. However, even in these groups, distrust is above 40%. One-third of the respondents do not trust the most trusted Fox TV. While this rate drops by a quarter for HDP voters and left-leaning people, it is 50% or more for Religious people and AKP voters.

8.

Approach To Different Identities

7.2. Identities and Social Distance

"Foreign" has various meanings for the participants. These meanings are diverse as "anyone I do not know", "those who are far from my religion and values", "non-Muslims", "those who are outside the country", "those who are outside the area I live in", "everyone outside my family and friends", "unlike me", "immigrants and asylum seekers".

Considering the responses provided to the question, the meanings attributed to "foreign" can be determined by belief, culture, tangible distance or the borders of the country lived in. Nevertheless, it is seen that the participants interviewed within the scope of qualitative research do not have a strong prejudice against the sections they consider as "foreign". For example, a significant majority of the participants state that they would not feel uncomfortable being a neighbor with a foreign person.

"For me, foreigners are mostly those outside the country. It is fine as long as my neighbor follows the rules. These rules are the rules of life. There would be no problem as long as they comply with the rules established by the state." (Male, Worker, Van, age 39).

"They are those who do not within the framework of your values and thoughts. Someone in the apartment who is not from the neighborhood is a foreigner, someone who is not from your religion is a foreigner. It does not bother me if my neighbor is a foreigner." (Male, Teacher, Tatvan, age 47).

"I would love to, our neighbors in our previous house were Christian, I learned a lot from them. I don't want to see the same type of people anyway. This is the reason why I didn't want to stay in Van, it's nice to have diversity." (Female, Teacher, Istanbul, age 24).

"It means coming from somewhere else to around us. What is important is humanity, you can have a foreign neighbor." (Male, Imam, Diyarbakır, age 48).

"People who feel lonely and are not accepted by anyone else, who have difficulties within themselves. Foreigners are people who come from elsewhere, cannot settle there, and have trouble there. The person who does not come to my region is a foreigner, for example, a person from Edirne is more foreign to me than a Syrian person." (Male, Imam, Adıyaman, age 59).

When we look at the identity-based social distances of the participants, it is seen that the identities that are the most distant are gay, atheist, nationalist and Syrian identities. Nearly two-thirds of respondents do not want a gay teacher or MP. This distance is more than half for Syrians. More than one-third of the participants distance themselves from Armenians and extremely religious identities. The distance to Alevi identity remains around 20%. The identity that the participants show the highest tolerance is the Turkish identity. The distance to this identity is at most 15%.

When it comes to the identity of the son-in-law, daughter-in-law or spouse, the distance to Syrian and Armenian identity is decreasing, while the distance to Alevi and Turkish identity is increasing. Here, the participants indicate that they assume Armenian and Syrian identities without getting to know them closely, and since they think that a situation such as marriage will be based on close relations and mutual love, identity may be secondary. However, since there is already an acquaintance for Turkish and Alevi identities, these identities are tolerated in public relations, while the distance increases for situations such as marriage, considering that family relations may cause cultural or faith-based problems. One-third of the participants stated that they would not consider it appropriate for their son-in-law/daughter-in-law or spouse to be an atheist.

	I DON'T WANT THEM TO BE MY CHILD'S TEACHER	I DON'T WANT THEM TO BE MY MP	I DON'T WANT THEM TO BE MY SON-IN-LAW/DAUGHTER-IN-LAW/SPOUSE
Eşcinsel	64%	62%	-
Atheist	53%	54%	-
Ülkücü	53%	55%	-
Syrian	52%	55%	35%
Armenian	38%	38%	33%
Extremely Religious	36%	36%	-
Alevi	20%	19%	23%
Turkish	8%	11%	15%
From another religion	-	-	34%

When looked at on a gender basis, it is understood that the tolerance towards atheists and those of other religions especially when it comes to family relations is lower in women. On the other hand, the identities where tolerance is lower in men than in women are Syrian, extremely religious, idealist and Turkish identities.

The distance to gay and atheist identities is over three quarters among those who consider themselves to be on the right and AKP voters. The distance to gays is emphasized by almost half of those who consider themselves on the left, and more than half of HDP voters.

The distance to idealist identity reflects the projection of the attitude towards the atheist identity, both among the right and the left, and among the AKP and HDP voters. In other words, the ratios of right and left and AKP and HDP voters switch positions in terms of the distance from this identity.

The only identity that does not change according to the right and left, different parties and the size of the city is towards the Syrians. The distance to Syrian identity turns into a common approach that cuts all these groups horizontally.

While the distance to extremely religion people is 19% for AKP voters and those positioned on the right, half of HDP voters and more than half of those on the left stand distant from this identity.

Those who position themselves on the right and AKP voters stand distant from Alevi identity while those who position themselves on the left and HDP voters are distant to Turkish identity.

I don't want them to be the MP of the city I live in.	TOTAL	RIGHT	LEFT	Metropolitan	Small City	AKP	CHP	HDP
Gay	62%	79%	47%	56%	76%	79%	48%	56%
Atheist	54%	73%	36%	50%	61%	74%	40%	45%
Ülkücü	55%	34%	73%	54%	58%	35%	43%	74%
Syrian	55%	56%	56%	54%	58%	55%	57%	54%
Armenian	38%	50%	22%	38%	38%	51%	36%	26%
Extremely Religious	36%	19%	57%	37%	36%	19%	46%	50%
Alevi	19%	27%	9%	22%	11%	26%	14%	13%
Turkish	11%	7%	14%	12%	9%	3%	4%	18%

I don't want them to be my child's teacher.	TOTAL	RIGHT	LEFT	Metropolitan	Small City	AKP	CHP	HDP
Gay	64%	78%	52%	59%	74%	79%	46%	60%
Atheist	53%	76%	35%	50%	60%	70%	43%	46%
Ülkücü	53%	31%	71%	52%	55%	33%	37%	73%
Syrian	52%	50%	54%	51%	54%	52%	49%	52%
Armenian	38%	50%	24%	38%	37%	51%	34%	27%
Extremely Religious	36%	15%	58%	36%	34%	17%	39%	51%
Alevi	20%	28%	11%	23%	14%	27%	11%	14%
Turkish	8%	6%	12%	11%	3%	2%	9%	12%

I don't want them to be my son-in-law, daughter-in-law or spouse.	TOTAL	RIGHT	LEFT	Metropolitan	Small City	AKP	CHP	HDP
Syrian	35%	37%	28%	32%	41%	35%	47%	32%
From other religion	34%	40%	19%	26%	51%	41%	31%	28%
Armenian	33%	42%	21%	31%	38%	39%	33%	25%
If they are Alevi	23%	26%	17%	25%	21%	28%	25%	16%
Turkish	15%	14%	14%	17%	10%	12%	21%	17%

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When we look at the comparisons of identity-based social distances, it is seen that the tolerance of the participants is higher compared to Turkey in general. In the data for Turkey as a whole, while the rate of those who do not want their city's MP and their child's teacher to be Syrian is more than 80%, this rate is around 50% for Kurdish participants. Similar differences are revealed for identities such as Armenian, gay and Alevi. In Turkey, the distance to those who are extremely religious is around 50%, compared to one-third of Kurdish respondents.

Another remarkable finding is the distance towards Kurdish identity in Turkey and Turkish identity among Kurds.

Across Turkey, the rate of those who do not want a Kurdish person to be a MP of their city is 31%. Among the Kurdish participants, the distance towards an MP with Turkish identity is 11%. Again, the rate of those who do not want their child's teacher to be a Kurdish person is 26% across Turkey. The rate of Kurds who do not want their child's teacher to be Turkish is 8%. In both categories, the distance towards Kurdish identity in Turkey is about three times the distance towards Turkish identity in the Kurds.

		KURDS	TURKEY
I DONT WANT THEM TO BE MY MP	Gay	62%	67%
	Atheist	54%	64%
	Syrian	55%	82%
	Ülkücü	55%	32%
	Armenian	38%	60%
	Extremely Religious	36%	49%
	Alevi	19%	28%
	Turkish	11%	5%
	Kurdish	5%	31%

		KURDS	TURKEY
I DONT WANT THEM TO BE MY CHILDS TEACHER	Gay	64%	70%
	Atheist	53%	64%
	Syrian	53%	32%
	Ülkücü	52%	81%
	Armenian	38%	59%
	Extremely Religious	36%	51%
	Alevi	20%	28%
	Turkish	8%	4%
	Kurdish	4%	26%

8.1.Attitude towards Immigrants

When the abstract identity of "foreigner" takes on a concrete appearance like Afghan or Syrian, the situation changes a little. Especially in the quantitative research findings, when the data on Afghan and Syrian refugees are examined, the negative attitude reveals itself more clearly.

Afghan immigrants in Turkey had become an important issue on the country's agenda at the time the research was conducted. While these discussions were ongoing, nearly half of the participants shared the view that none of the Afghan immigrants should be accepted in response to the question asked. The rate of those who support the acceptance of Afghan immigrants without any conditions is 7%. When those who say that they can be accepted depending on the conditions such as "those in a difficult situation" or "those be selected" are included in this, the rate of those who think that Afghan immigrants can be accepted becomes 50%.

Opinions on the entry of Afghan immigrants to Turkey	TOTAL	RIGHT	LEFT	AKP	CHP	HDP
No Afghan immigrants should be accepted	44%	43%	52%	38%	56%	47%
Only few Afghan immigrants in difficult situations should be accepted	26%	28%	22%	27%	21%	26%
Very few immigrants should be accepted selectively	17%	12%	15%	19%	21%	16%
All Afghan immigrants should be accepted as refugees	7%	13%	6%	9%	1%	8%
I don't have any opinions/I don't know	6%	4%	5%	7%	1%	4%

More than two-thirds of the respondents oppose granting citizenship to Syrian refugees. This does not mean that one-third agree, because most of the rest remain undecided. The rate of those advocating the immediate deportation of all refugees is 44%. A similar proportion of respondents think that refugees should stay in camps, not cities, until they are sent back. While more than 60% of the respondents lean towards the acceptance of those in difficult situation today, they think that they should be sent back when the war is over.

	TOTAL	RIGHT	LEFT	Metropolitan	Small City	AKP	CHP	HDP
Syrian refugees should not be given the right to Turkish citizenship.	68%	64%	71%	60%	88%	64%	77%	72%
Those in the most difficult situations can stay for today, but most should be sent back to their country as soon as possible.	60%	48%	63%	51%	81%	59%	68%	64%
They should all be sent back when the war in their country is over.	62%	51%	62%	53%	83%	61%	68%	63%
All of them should be sent back to their countries as soon as possible.	44%	38%	48%	42%	49%	41%	61%	44%
If they cannot be sent back now, they must live in camps, not cities.	43%	41%	45%	40%	51%	39%	60%	41%

In general, it can be thought that the negative attitude towards refugees and foreigners is one of the main elements that define right-wing thought, but when it comes to Afghan and Syrian refugees, it is seen that those who position themselves on the left and HDP voters present a more negative approach. While 6% of those who position themselves on the left support the acceptance of all Afghan immigrants, this rate is 13% among those who position themselves on the right. Again, for example, the idea that all Syrian refugees "should be sent back to their countries as soon as possible" is supported by 38% of those who see themselves on the right, while this rate is 48% among those who position themselves on the left.

The main reason for this situation is the acceptance of the refugees by AKP government and AKP opposition' interpretation of this acceptance as "AKP has other agendas". The fact that the refugees mention the name Erdoğan while expressing their feelings of gratitude causes the opposition to associate the refugees negatively with AKP and Erdoğan. While this situation reinforces the negative attitude of left-wingers, most of whom are opposed to Erdoğan, it also brings fore the approach of "tolerance" among right-wingers in order not to contradict Erdoğan's policies. When all these factors come together, the negative approach towards refugees can be more dominant in leftist views compared to rightist views.

On the other hand, unlike the quantitative data analyzed above, it is seen that the anti-refugee stance is weaker in the qualitative interviews. Some responses to the question "what do you think about the arrival of refugees in your city?" asked to the participants clearly show this:

"Nobody wants to be a refugee and nobody wants to be displaced. If they have to come here, it is our duty to protect them. I am not disturbed by the arrival of refugees in our country, we should not exclude them." (Female, Accountant, Istanbul, age 44).

"I don't find it right. We should support those who really need it. But it is not right for us to let everyone into the country when the world does not support them." (Female, Teacher, Diyarbakır, age 24).

"Turkey allows refugees to come, this is a general situation. I feel sorry for them, no one wants to be displaced. I am not bothered when they come. I am sad that they are displaced. (Male, Worker, Van, age 35).

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"I don't want them too much. These people need to be sheltered. Theft will increase, so immigration policy should be stopped" (Male, Merchant, Muş, age 40).

"I think this is right. Because these refugees do not have any opportunities." (Male, Teacher, Van, age 40).

"They are the oppressed. I wish something like this hadn't happened to them. I'm not bothered about them coming here, I'm bothered by those who are bothered." (Male, Civil Servant, Van, age 40).

"We went too far. We are not a self-sufficient country. We should help, after all, we are a Muslim country. But we went too far." (Male, Tradesman, Van, 43).

One of the reasons for the difference in quantitative and qualitative interviews with refugees can be considered as the impact of data collection methods on the participants. The participants were asked about the reasons for their attitudes in the superficial quantitative interviews while they were asked about the reasons for their attitudes in the in-depth qualitative interviews. In such a situation, the tendency of qualitative interviewers to empathize more with refugees under difficult conditions comes to the fore.

		SAMPLE	TURKEY
AFGHANS	No Afghan immigrants should be accepted	44%	66%
	Only few Afghan immigrants in difficult situations should be accepted	26%	10%
	Very few immigrants should be accepted selectively	17%	16%
	All Afghan immigrants should be accepted as refugees	7%	3%
	I don't have any opinions / I don't know	6%	6%
SYRIANS	Syrian refugees should not be given the right to Turkish citizenship.	68%	78%
	Those in the most difficult situations can stay for today, but most should be sent back to their country as soon as possible.	60%	72%
	They should all be sent back when the war in their country is over.	62%	79%
	All of them should be sent back to their countries as soon as possible.	44%	72%
	If they cannot be sent back now, they must live in camps, not cities.	43%	60%

However, it seems that the exclusionary rhetoric towards Afghan and Syrian refugees throughout Turkey is not as strong in the Kurdish region. For example, the opposition to accepting Afghan immigrants in Turkey in general is 50% higher, according to the findings of the study conducted with Kurdish participants. Again, opposition to the citizenship of Syrian refugees is 10 points higher in Turkey in general. The rate of those who support the idea of sending all Syrian refugees back as soon as possible is 63% more than the Kurdish participants in Turkey.

9.

Attitude Towards Right-Left

	TOTAL	WOMEN	MEN	RELIGIOUS	AKP	CHP	HDP
LEFT	31,4%	22%	40%	26%	2%	60%	51%
CENTER	47,2%	58%	38%	42%	50%	38%	42%
RIGHT	21,4%	20%	23%	33%	48%	2%	6%

Almost half of the participants position themselves at the "center" of the political spectrum. The rate of those who identify themselves on the left are 31,4% while this rate is 21,4% for the right. One-third of those who consider themselves religious above the average state that they are on the right of the political spectrum while one-fourth of them say that they are on the left.

It is seen that various factors are effective in the approach of the participants to the right-left categories as well as the meanings they attribute to these categories. For example, while the left evokes concepts such as "equality, freedom, closeness to the oppressed, justice, respect for differences, pro-democrat labor" for the participants who see themselves close to the left, the right evokes concepts such as "nationalist, discriminatory, statist, abusing religion, intolerance towards different opinions, partisanship, enmity and repetition". For the participants who position themselves close to the right-wing category, the left connotes "hostility towards religion, Communism, secularism, Kemalism and being marginalized", while the right connotes "respecting religious values, being a good person, service and investment, being close to the values of the society".

BEING A RIGHTIST		BEING A LEFTIST	
Religious	10%	Marginal opponent	3%
Bad	6%	Equality	3%
Racism	3%	Good	3%
Partisan	3%	Hostility towards religion	3%
Good	3%	Bad	2%
Thought	3%	Belonging	2%
Fascism	3%	Freedom	2%
Government	2%	Closeness to the oppressed	2%
Bigotry	2%	Publicist	2%
AKP	2%	CHP	2%
Nationalism	1%	Revolution	1%
Discrimination	1%	Justice	1%
State	1%	Laborer	1%
Unnecessary	1%	Progressive	1%
Ülkücü	1%	Opposite	1%

It is seen that the religious approach is especially effective for political preferences of religious/conservative participants while the source of motivation that is effective in the right and left views of those who are close to the conservative/right view is basically religion. If the person is religious/conservative, they position themselves closer to the right-wing category, which they deem as more compatible with religion compared to the left.

> *"Since we are conservative, our political preferences also change in that direction"* *(Male, Construction Worker, Van, 35).*

Individuals' thoughts about which political party they see on the right or on the left are also based on the motivation that is effective in their views towards the right and left. For example, the fact that the participants consider AKP farther to the right compared to MHP seems to be related to this. Rightists and leftists consider AKP on the right at the same rate, however, they do this by attributing different meanings to "right".

Assessment of how far right the parties are	GENERAL	AKP	CHP	HDP	RIGHTIST	LEFTIST
AKP	76%	85%	64%	76%	83%	83%
CHP	19%	12%	22%	24%	13%	24%
İYİP	44%	27%	31%	59%	33%	65%
MHP	68%	67%	59%	72%	75%	78%
HDP	13%	12%	22%	13%	20%	13%
SAADET	51%	40%	45%	59%	45%	63%
HÜDA-PAR	46%	34%	37%	57%	41%	67%
DEVA	39%	31%	33%	47%	39%	55%
GELECEK	44%	29%	49%	55%	39%	60%

Therefore, while those who see themselves on the left associate rightism with the negative attributions exemplified above, religious/conservative participants see rightism as associated with reasonable religiosity rather than nationalism or statism:

> *"I feel close to that view since I am religious. I am more interested in the religious side of the right rather than the nationalism side." (Male, Worker, Van, age 39).*

There is a strong acceptance that the left is "distanced from religion", particularly among religious-conservative participants close to the right. While explaining the reasons for closeness to the right, these participants mostly use arguments that the left is "anti-religion" and "distant to religion". This image of the left on the right is an important factor in determining the distance to the left and the closeness to the right among religious conservatives..

"I see myself as distant from the left because if the left wants to get our vote, it has to take into account our religious sensitivities. I see myself on the right because of our religious views and family structure." (Male, Imam, Urfa, age 36)

"I am far from the left because of their completely hostile attitude towards religion. Although their understanding of freedom seems good, we saw that when they came to power, they were not like this in the context of human rights and they put a lot of pressure on religious people." (Male, Teacher, Van, age 40).

However, it should be noted that some participants did not find the right-left definitions appropriate for themselves. While some of these participants associate Muslim identity with an alternative politics by saying that "Muslims do not have a right-left view", some of them think that the right-left scale cannot meet the relevant political diversity, and there are gray areas in this respect. Therefore, political positioning of the participants in this category requires a more comprehensive interpretation of the political spectrum and an approach that takes into consideration the diversity of gray areas:

"I am a Muslim. A Muslim cannot be a rightist or leftist. Being a Muslim applies to every aspect of your life, what is essential is Islam" (Male, Civil Servant, Van, age 40).

"I don't think I have to be on the right or on the left. I try to be on the side of whoever is doing the right thing in terms of behavior, justice, human values" (Male, Imam, Adıyaman, age 59).

Concerns and contradictions regarding the "religious Kurdish" identity come to the fore in some participants' views on the left and right. The tensions arising from the fact that the following participants are "religious Kurds" are clearly visible in their relationship with the right-left categories:

"I don't know, neither side represents me. You are both conservative and Kurdish, you cannot put yourself in one place. I have always been conservative. We go to religious conversations. We are right the people from the right. We are trying to live in accordance with Islam. Seeing what we've been through lately, I can't position myself there either. I don't feel close to either side." (Female, Secretary, İzmir, age 44).

"I care about the left's ideas about my nation since I am Kurdish. However, their ideas on religiosity also distance me from them. I distance myself from rightism as well due to their identity and bigotry, however I also feel close due to their approach on religion" (Male, Worker, Van, age 35).

Considering the views of the participants on the values of the right and left; it is seen that values such as labor, equality, public, justice, democracy, environmental awareness are perceived as close to the left while values such as religiosity, nationalism, nation, development, unity of the family are perceived as close to the right. However, it can be said that there is a polarization regarding values such as justice and service. While those who consider themselves on the left emphasize this value as a leftist value, the stance of those who position themselves on the right follows the opposite course.

Value	Closer to the Left	Average	Closer to the Right
Religiosity	10%	34%	55%
Nationalism	14%	34%	52%
National Security	17%	39%	44%
Patriotism	23%	45%	32%
Nation	25%	40%	35%
Development	26%	44%	30%
Unity of the family	25%	48%	27%
Republic	32%	36%	32%
Unity	35%	39%	26%
Service	34%	42%	24%
Environmental Awareness	34%	44%	22%
Democracy	41%	33%	26%
Justice	41%	36%	24%
Public	43%	35%	22%
Equality	46%	35%	19%
Labor	48%	32%	20%

■ Closer to the Left   ■ Average   ■ Closer to the Right

		POLITIC POSITION	
		RIGHTIST	LEFTIST
Religiosit	To Left	9%	13%
	To Right	62%	50%
Nationalism	To Left	13%	14%
	To Right	50%	61%
National Security	To Left	12%	26%
	To Right	49%	40%
Patriotism	To Left	13%	39%
	To Right	46%	21%
Nation	To Left	16%	37%
	To Right	46%	26%
Development	To Left	14%	45%
	To Right	41%	20%
Unit of the Family	To Left	14%	42%
	To Right	43%	15%
Republic	To Left	26%	46%
	To Right	41%	21%

		POLITIC POSITION	
		RIGHTIST	LEFTIST
Unity	To Left	17%	54%
	Sağa	43%	16%
Service	To Left	16%	58%
	Sağa	41%	9%
Enviromental Awareness	To Left	19%	58%
	To Right	37%	8%
Democracy	To Left	22%	71%
	To Right	43%	7%
Justice	To Left	19%	69%
	To Right	40%	10%
Public	To Left	23%	69%
	To Right	39%	8%
Equality	To Left	27%	72%
	To Right	33%	7%
Labor	To Left	28%	72%
	To Right	35%	9%

9.1. Political - National Fears

One of the ismportant elements that define the right/conservative worldview is the political-national fears about division and external threats. It is seen that such fears, which are one of the founding elements of the Turkish right, find a strong response in the Kurdish right/conservative sections as well. However, certain approaches are also embraced by participants who have gone beyond the rightist and have leftist thinking.

	TOTAL	Women	Men	RIGHT	CENTER	LEFT	Religious	AK Parti	CHP	HDP
Human rights can be violated if national security is at stake.	16,8%	15%	19%	25%	10%	13%	17%	23%	24%	10%
Germany is jealous of the Third Bridge and the New Airport	14,8%	16%	14%	25%	7%	10%	16%	27%	13%	8%
Jewish people rule the world.	28,3%	26%	30%	36%	18%	27%	27%	31%	23%	28%

Many of the qualitative participants, especially those who have right/conservative tendencies, consider that there are external threats to Turkey, that "Zionists have their eyes on these lands" and that this region is also under the threat of partition, although they do not attribute the only reason for the problems in the Kurdish region to external forces:

"There is such a danger. There has always been a danger in the Mediterranean. Foreign powers were always involved. There have always been internal and external forces. In 1954, US troops settles in Hakkari and Şırnak. Following these events, after 1982, the PKK emerged. There are many factors. There are the USA, Germany, Spain, France. Jews rule the world" (Male, Teacher, Urfa, age 36).

"This thought was always present, but it has not been effective. We are a country with fertile lands, everyone may want to live here. It is also valid for the Kurdish region. Zionists have their eyes on this region anyway. Zionists see themselves as the beloved servants of Allah, so they think that everyone else is their servants. I think Zionism is the idea of dominating the whole world with the thought that we are here and the others are our slaves." (Male, Teacher, Tatvan, age 47).

"There are few countries in Islamic countries that try to stand up for themselves. This happens because we do not obey allegiance. Of course, the Zionists have their eyes on this country. There is the problem of division and fragmentation." (Male, Merchant, Muş, age 46).

"It has been going on from the past and they want to disorganize the country, especially because we are a Muslim society since the past. They use Kurds for their own projects. Works of the Zionists have been going on for a long time. It is not possible to divide the country, however, the problem of external forces gas been there for a long time." (Male, Worker, Van, age 39).

"International forces want to use young population. They also direct the Kurds. The Zionists have their eyes on our country and they are working for it." (Female, Teacher, Diyarbakır, age 30).

"Zionists plan to divide us. We know that the great states always want to divide us, on the pretext that they want to bring democracy. In addition, competition between states also affects this condition. We have seen what the USA did to Syria and Afghanistan from the other end of the world. They aim to divide Turkey for their own interests. About the Kurdish issue, external forces only have a desire to take advantage of the current problem, they are not the ones who created this problem. This is a problem Turkey has not solved for years" (Female, Accountant, Istanbul, age 44).

	TOTAL	Women	Men	Religious	Metropolitan	Small City	AKP	CHP	HDP
Leftist view is more beneficial to society than rightist view.	31,2%	28%	34%	21%	34%	25%	12%	46%	49%
Communism is a threat to Kurdish society.	22,1%	23%	21%	18%	19%	30%	31%	18%	20%

Those who see leftist view as harmful to society and communism as a threat to Kurdish society are mostly conservative/rightist participants. Another interesting finding is that those living in metropolitan cities tend to be more leftist than those living in small cities. On the basis of parties, there is a relationship between supporting a right-wing or left-wing party and the approach towards the right and left. Those who support right/conservative parties may see communism as a threat compared to those who support leftist parties. When we take a look at the qualitative data, it is understood that some participants view the left view as dangerous for the society based on the grounds they have a right/conservative world view and consider this view as related to religion/traditional culture. Therefore, the left can be understood as a threat to religion and society from the right.

> *"The right view is more beneficial. They are more sensitive in terms of Islam… [Left] is dangerous, a threat for Islam." (Male, Imam, Urfa, age 36).*
>
> *"It is good if they can put everything into practice. They are good in terms of equality and social state. But it is dangerous for me. Because their views are against Islam." (Male, Tradesman, Van, age 43).*
>
> *"[Left] is dangerous. They have a negative purpose to convey the society to irreligion. It is definitely a threat. Because it is an opinion that conflicts with Islam" (Male, Worker, Van, age 35).*
>
> *"The right view is more beneficial. I think it would be more beneficial to organize the society based on religious. Communism is a threat to society." (Female, Teacher, Diyarbakır, age 30).*

10.

Perception Of Nationalism

Most of the participants approach the concept of nationalism negatively. However, it can be said that nationalism attracts attention both by the ones who prefer options involving nationalism when emphasizing their identity and when the levels of nationalism of the participants is taken into account as a whole.

For example, in the light of all qualitative interviews, it is possible to say that the participants approached the concept of nationalism clearly and negatively. For some participants, this approach is related to the Pan-Islamism or leftist internationalist worldview, while for others, it is related to understanding and experiencing Turkish nationalism as an exclusionary form of nationalism. The fact that the participants are Kurds and consider nationalism in a dominant and exclusionary form reveals a distant approach towards this concept. Although there are various comments about nationalism, the viewed repeated by most participants is "being against all kinds of nationalism".

"I think it is racism with a different name. It depends on the meaning you attach to the word "nationality". For us, nation means ummah. Because Islam rejects nationalism. Islam defends brotherhood." (Male, Adıyaman, Retired Teacher, age 70).

"I see it negatively. It is a fascist view. I don't see it positively because of my religious views. There is no superiority of any race over another race in human values. (Male, Civil Servant, Van, age 47).

"I am against all forms of nationalism, I defend humanism. A person may love their own language and race, but they should not blare it out. You have no superiority over me, nor I have any superiority over you." (Female, Teacher, Istanbul, age 24).

"I am against any kind of it, it is not a good thing. It doesn't matter whether it is Turkish or Kurdish. I'll be in the center." (Female, Teacher, Diyarbakır, age 24).

"I am against any form of nationalism. This marginalizes people and divides the society." (Male, Teacher, Urfa, age 36).

"Our Prophet did not approve of nationalism either. I think any form of it is a feeling given by the Satan." (Female, Teacher, Diyarbakır, age 30).

"Nationalism is not a trend I prefer or approve of. I don't like nationalism because it has an approach that positions a nation's being better and on better places while ignoring other nations." (Female, Public Relations Expert, Istanbul, age 42).

"I find nationalism very dangerous. I think it is as bad for one person to constantly boost their own nation and exclude the others." (Male, Imam, Adıyaman, age 59).

"It's an ideology I don't like because I think it is highly divisive. At this point, I think they are very prejudiced in terms of my ethnic origin and it hurts us in that sense. This is why I don't like it." (Female, employed?, Istanbul, age 46).

"I don't like it and our prophet forbade it. I don't like Kurdish or Turkish nationalism. My wife is Turkish and from Osmaniye, we are in harmony. I sometimes encounter[nationalism] in Osmaniye. We didn't choose this, God gave it to us. I don't understand why they have problems with the Kurds." (Male, Barber, Tatvan, age 45).

Here, it is necessary to mention certain socio-political reasons that reveal the approach of "being against all forms of nationalism", which also indicates a relatively risk-free position in terms of distance to both Turkish and Kurdish nationalism. First of all, nationalism can be understood as a concept loaded with negative meanings, since the participants are Kurds and an important part of their Kurdish experience is to encounter the adversities and exclusionary forms of mainstream Turkish nationalism in the country. There are numerous factors that construct nationalism as a positive and proud identity for a Turkish person: national education, media, military service, and all the ideological apparatuses of the state have been used to build Turkish nationalism as a legitimate and acceptable identity throughout the history. Although there are alternative forms of nationalism for a Kurdish person, since Kurdish nationalism exists in non-state (even anti-state) areas and points to a dangerous identity that the state sees as illegitimate, it can be perceived as a burden that requires paying a price, rather than being legitimate and acceptable. Therefore, this kind of nationalism, which is not legally acceptable for many Kurds from the right-conservative views, is not an identity to be proud of, but a phenomenon to be distanced from for a secure and relatively more acceptable political position. There is a "distance" from nationalism for left-wing participants, although not as much as right-wing participants. The "distance" here may also result from seeing a contradiction between the "internationalist" worldview and nationalism, in addition to the abovementioned experiences.

BEING TURKISH		BEING KURDISH	
Racism / Nationalism	9,4%	The oppressed	3,5%
Brotherhood	5,6%	Brotherhood	3,4%
Unity-Solidarity	2,7%	Discrimination	3,3%
Citizen	2,4%	Nation	3,2%
Humanity	2,1%	Citizen	2,9%
Discrimination	1,9%	Humanity	2,9%
Good	1,8%	Good	2,8%
Homeland	1,8%	Mother Tongue	2,6%
Turkey	1,2%	Togetherness	2,5%
Flag	1,2%	Honor	2,1%
Respect and Honor	1,2%	Freedom	1,7%
War	1,1%	Equality	1,7%
Language	1,1%	Persecution and violation of rights	1,7%
Bad	1,0%	Pride	1,6%
Atatürk	1,0%	Public	1,2%

11% of the participants think that the concept of nationalism is close to the left, and 42% of them think that this concept is close to the right.

NATİONALİSM	TOTAL	Women	Men	RIGHT	LEFT	AKP	CHP	HDP
Closer to the left	11%	10%	13%	11%	12%	6%	27%	12%
In the center	28%	27%	29%	33%	21%	33%	35%	23%
Closer to the right	42%	42%	43%	45%	52%	43%	28%	50%
I don't have any opinions/I don't know	19%	21%	16%	11%	16%	18%	10%	15%

In the section where self-identities are asked, 10% of the qualitative research participants stated that they are Kurdish Nationalists and 6% stated that they are Turkish Nationalists. It is seen that Kurdish nationalism is embraced as a primary identity by both rightist and leftist views at the same rate. In contrast, 17% of HDP voters and 4% of AKP voters identify themselves as Kurdish nationalists. The rate of Turkish nationalism among those who position themselves on the right and AKP voters is around 10%.

	TOTAL	Women	Men	RIGHT	CENTER	LEFT	AKP	CHP	HDP
Kurdish Nationalist	10%	9%	12%	10%	9%	10%	4%	5%	17%
Turkish Nationalist	6%	6%	6%	9%	4%	3%	10%	5%	3%

When it comes to a more concrete context such as Kurdish nationalism from an abstract position such as the concept of nationalism, there is a loosening in the negative sense attributed to nationalism, and Kurdish nationalism is embraced to a considerable extent by those at both ends of the political spectrum.

While most views on nationalism are "being against all forms of it", some participants distinguish between Turkish nationalism and Kurdish nationalism, and view Kurdish nationalism in a context that does not exclude other identities and claims rights if nothing else. While these views assess Turkish nationalism as a negative ideology that excludes and suppresses Turkish nationalism, they may find Kurdish nationalism more acceptable as they associate with protecting the rights and culture/language of the Kurdish society:

"This is why I don't think nationalism is right: As a Kurdish citizen, I will make a comment by distinguishing Kurdish nationalism from normal [mainstream] nationalism. Namely; Kurdish nationalism is in a position to defend its oppressed culture, trying to bring it to light. That's why I see Kurdish nationalism as normal." (Female, Secretary, İzmir, age 44).

"I love my culture and language more than anything, but I don't elevate it to an [exclusionary] nationalism level. I am already a Kurdish nationalist." (Female, Teacher, Istanbul, age 24).

"I am in favor of all kinds of struggles regarding the rights of the Kurds, provided that there is no violence and on the condition of not excluding others in terms of cultural rights in this sense… These rights should take precedence over fundamental rights. For example, the Kurds should have the same rights as the Turks." (Male, Imam, Adıyaman, age 59).

"It can happen on the condition that it is not racist. Kurdish nationalism is not racist. Turks exaggerate." (Male, Tradesman, Muş, age?).

"I am a Kurd, because I was born a Kurd. I consider myself a Kurdish nationalist because of the Turkish pressure on the Kurds. Maybe if one day the oppression of the Kurds ends, I will think differently" (Male, Teacher, Van, 40).

"I am not a Kurdish nationalist like MHP does. My nationalism stems from my love for my people, language and culture. I think like that because there is a common background." (Male, Lawyer, Diyarbakır, age 29).

"When I compare it, Kurdish nationalism have not used a language of marginalization because it has not found a power at its current stage. However, Turkish nationalism has a language that always creates an other." (Male, Civil Servant, Van, age 30).

"I think Kurdish nationalism will never reach a dangerous level. Because the Kurds would not want to do the same since they suffered from this. They don't want to spread hate, because they have developed a sense of empathy. They do not do this because they, themselves, are subject to exclusion. All they want is to be able to speak their language comfortably." (Female, Accountant, Istanbul, age 44).

Considering the findings of the questions asked to all respondents about the extent to which they see themselves as Kurdish nationalists, it is understood that whether they define their worldview as Kurdish nationalist or not, about one-fourth of the respondents consider themselves to be Kurdish nationalists at a high level. Under this subject, where there is no significant difference between the genders, rightist and leftist views also adopt Kurdish nationalism in similar ways while those who position themselves in the center adopt Kurdish nationalism to a lesser extent.

Despite the acceptance that Kurdish nationalism is represented through HDP in Turkey, as nationalism is a phenomenon inherent in the right-conservative identity, it is seen that Kurdish nationalism is embraced to a considerable extent by Kurdish religious people and Kurdish voters of AKP. Low or high levels religiosity do not seem to cause a clear distinction. While two-thirds of HDP voters embrace Kurdish nationalism at a medium or high level, nearly half of AKP voters adopt this identity.

Level of Kurdish Nationalism	TOPLAM	POLITICAL VIEW			RELIGIOSITY			LOCATION		VOTING PREFERENCE		
		Right	Center	Left	Low	Average	High	egion	West	AKP	CHP	HDP
None	19,0%	17%	26%	16%	19%	18%	20%	20%	12%	22%	17%	16%
Low	25,1%	22%	35%	21%	25%	24%	26%	26%	15%	29%	23%	20%
Average	32,2%	34%	28%	33%	29%	36%	31%	30%	48%	29%	46%	34%
High	23,7%	27%	11%	30%	27%	22%	23%	24%	25%	20%	14%	30%

The rate of those who think that there is a need for unity among Kurds who are citizens of different countries, and who look favorably on symbols such as the Kurdish National Anthem and the Kurdish Flag, is over 40%. Those who see themselves on the right have a positive view of these concepts, which imply a sense of

belonging to a nation, at a rate of one-third or more, and those who see themselves on the left at a rate of nearly two-thirds. These rates also show that unlike Turkey, where Turkish nationalism is associated with the right-wing category, nationalism in Kurdish society is closer to the left-wing category politically.

Those who think that there is a need for unity among Kurds who are citizens of different countries

	GENDER		POLITICAL VIEW			RELIGIOSITY			LOCATION		VOTING PREFERENCE		
TOTAL	Women	Men	RIGHT	CENTER	LEFT	Low	Average	High	REGION	WEST	AKP	CHP	HDP
42,6%	39%	46%	34%	35%	59%	49%	37%	46%	42%	50%	27%	42%	59%

Those who look favorably on Kurdish Flag and Kurdish National Anthem

	TOTAL	Women	Men	POLITICAL VIEW			RELIGIOSITY			LOCATION		VOTING PREFERENCE		
				RIGHT	CENTER	LEFT	Low	Average	High	REGION	WEST	AKP	CHP	HDP
Kurdish Flag	41,6%	37%	45%	44%	22%	56%	45%	38%	44%	40%	54%	39%	34%	52%
Kurdish National Anthem	40,2%	37%	43%	44%	21%	53%	44%	38%	40%	38%	54%	36%	31%	50%

In the background of this approach to Kurdish nationalism, there are both the recognition problems and rights demands regarding the Kurdish identity as well as the reactive attitudes created by the "exclusive" approach of Turkish nationalism. Many of those who identify themselves as religious give the answer "Religious/Muslim" when asked whether an outsider sees would see them as Kurdish or religious first. However, when we ask the question again as whether, when viewed from the outside, they would be considered y by an outsider as Kurdish or religious first in a Western city with Turkish majority rather than their hometown with Kurdish majority, the majority of the respondents answer as "Kurdish":

"Being a Muslim should always come first. However, when viewed from the outside [in the West], my Kurdish identity is more prominent" (Female, Civil Servant, Bingöl, age 45).

"An outsider would see my Kurdishness. I think the outsider decides on this based on appearance. I think they judge people by their appearance or even speech. Since I think that Kurdish people are treated unfairly in terms of discourse, I can answer to people, therefore my Kurdish identity comes to the fore more" (Female, Employed, Istanbul, age 46).

"It changes according to the region we live in. A person living in the West sees me as a Kurd while a person here sees me as a Muslim" (Male, Civil Servant, Van, age 40).

"When I was in Ankara, I had to defend my Kurdish identity in the theological education environment, because I was among Muslims and these conservative nationalists were at the forefront in Ankara. They had discourses such as "Good thing it happened, they deserved it" (Female, Teacher, Van, age 31).

Therefore, especially when they face with a problem of (non)recognition or misrecognition in a city with Turkish majority, the Kurdish identity in terms of religious Kurds, religious-Kurd can turn into Kurd-religious in terms of relationality and reflexive aspect of the identity. Majority of the participants state that their religious identity outweighs their religious and ethnic identity, and they think that the hierarchy between the two is in favor of the former. However, it is seen that this hierarchy has disappeared or reversed, especially for the participants who have faced with Turkish nationalism or experienced exclusion based on their ethnic identity. The answers given to the question "Do you think the Islamic brotherhood can be a solution for problems of Kurdish people?" we asked to the participants in relation to this context show that "Islamic brotherhood" is given a positive value in the ideal sense, however, there is a critical description towards the current political discourse of "Islamic brotherhood".

"If we were Muslims in actual terms, we would not have any problems. If everyone adopted the Islamic brotherhood in a justified by, there would be no problems. Everyone in Turkey thinks about their own interests." (Male, Imam, Diyarbakır, age 48).

"Currently, the concept of Islamic brotherhood would not bring a solution in Turkey. There is serious pressure on the Kurdish language and the Kurds. Kurdish is being forgotten and tried to be forgotten. Kurds are despised and forced to work in hard labor. In addition, the persons elected by the Kurds are constantly replaced by trustees. The preferences of the Kurds are ignored. This is actually a serious problem." (Male, Teacher, Van, age 40).

"It cannot be in its current form. I don't think this problem will be resolved this way. Because people don't look at it that way anymore, they consider it in a different way." (Female, Teacher, Van, age 31).

"This isn't about Islam, this is about racism. Kurds, Turks and Arabs say they are all Muslims, however, we see very little that they can get along with each other. This shows us that Islam does not solve any problems." (Female, Teacher, Diyarbakır, age 30).

"Absolutely. In fact, the only solution is Islam. Our Prophet says that you cannot be a real Muslim if you do not want for your brother what you want for yourself. It means if we are brothers, we love each other. You should want for the person you love what you want for yourself." (Female, Accountant, Istanbul, age 44).

"The biggest handicap is that they are trying to intimidate the Kurds with this concept. They always create perception by Islam and Islamic brotherhood. How can we be brothers under these circumstances? You do not accept my language, my homeland. You do not recognize my existence. You do not accept anything. I think it is romantic. It is something that distracts the Kurds. Islamic brotherhood is used in order not to give rights." (Female, Secretary, İzmir, age 44).

"Practice is important. We say Islamic brotherhood and justice, but it will have no meaning if it doesn't happen in practice. When it is used in Turkey, people who live differently in practice are triggered by that word of brotherhood." (Male, Imam, Adıyaman, age 59).

11.

Perception Of State

STATE	
Togetherness	7,6%
Nation	7,3%
Homeland	6,7%
Justice	2,9%
Power	2,9%
Administration	2,5%
Necessity	1,8%
Border	1,7%
Defending	1,7%
Flag	1,7%
Family	1,7%
Monism	1,6%
Pressure	1,6%
Turkey	1,5%
Order	1,4%

There is diversity in the perceptions of the participants towards both the state as an objective phenomenon and the state of which they are citizens. Majority of them think that the people needs state and rulers, and a stateless society is not possible.

> *"It is not possible, there must be an order. The worst state is better than no state."*
> *(Male, Civil Servant, Bingöl, age 40).*

Some participants state that it is necessary to have a critical vision of the state and the rulers, that it is not right to bless the state and obey the rulers without question. Some participants, who think that obedience also has limits, consider whether the state is Islamic or just as a criterion:

> *"We already have a Republican system. Why should we need rulers? We obey them when they should obey us. We misused the Republican system. I also tell my students that we do not need to kiss the hands of the rulers. There is fanaticism in everything in our country. There should be no fanaticism in the family, football, politics…" (Female, Teacher, Istanbul, age 24).*
>
> *"As a Muslim, it is a must to obey a ruler who is not contrary to Islam and does no harm to Islam, as mentioned in the hadith.If you are not in such a state, for example, you live*

65

> *in a Christian state, you must also obey if they do not cause harm to your religion. Today, our state is not in a position that causes obvious harm to Islam, so it is necessary to obey them." (Male, Imam, Urfa, age 36).*
>
> *"They should be obeyed as long as they do not openly oppose the God's orders. The necessary thing will be done if they go against Islam. (Male, Civil Servant, Van, age 40).*
>
> *"It is not necessary. It is a human product, it is a human construct, it is wrong to consider them sacred." (Male, Teacher, Van, age 40).*
>
> *"No. The current state is not a state anyway, they do not really rule us." (Female, Civil Servant, Bingöl, age 45).*

Negative connotations of the state are also remarkable in the responses of some participants. Considering these views, it is understood that the state specifically connotates the State of Turkey and this is related to the policies towards Kurdish identity throughout the history:

> *"The state is home. It protects the citizen living within the borders of the state, defends their rights, educates and teaches them. The current state does not do this. The concept of Turkey is what bothers me in the current state." (Male, Engineer, Van, age 38).*
>
> *"I think of hierarchy, disorder, nepotism, oppressed minorities, inequality." (Male, Musician, Diyarbakır, age 25).*
>
> *"When we say the state in the classical sense, we say my country. However, the state's point of view may seem oppressive and the concept of the state is not very sympathetic when you look at it as a Kurdish person." (Female, Employed, Istanbul, age 46).*

Here, we can talk about a unique perception of state created by the experiences of being a Kurd or looking at the world as a Kurd. As one female participant stated, the state "may seem oppressive when you look at it as a Kurdish person." Therefore, it is understood that exclusionary policies towards Kurdish identity throughout the history have influenced these negative connotations on the concept of the state. "Oppressive" policies implemented by the state against the constitutional recognition of the Kurdish identity and their demands for recognition can also negatively shape the perception of the state of those belonging to this identity. In this sense, the experience of being a Kurd can create negative perceptions towards the state, unlike the meanings a Turkish person attributes to the concept of state.

OVERVIEW OF CONCEPTS AND SYMBOLS

Symbol	Percentage
Students Pledge	18%
Kemalism	35%
29 October Republic Day	39%
Turkish National Anthem	50%
Turkish Flag	51%

This point is evident in some of the questions we asked the participants. For example, there is a distance towards the state and its symbols, flag, national anthem, military, martyrdom, official holidays, nationalism and other founding symbols, people and institutions in a significant part of participants. The symbol with which the participants were most distant is the students' pledge. More than four-fifths of the participants have a negative view of the students' pledge, which is experienced more in daily life compared to the others, demanded to be abolished by the Kurdish public, especially the civil society, and finally stopped being practiced in schools in 2014.

Up to one-third of the participants consider symbols such as Kemalism and Republic Day positively. The two symbols that the participants find most positive are the flag and the national anthem, however, these symbols are perceived positively only by half of the participants.

It is understood that this attitude of the participants stems from the fact that the aforementioned phenomena are constructed based on a certain ethnic identity (being Turkish) and are used in an exclusionary way, for instance, against Kurds or other identities.

"I am against fetishism in the name of the Turkish Flag. Otherwise, I don't have a problem with the Turkish Flag, I don't feel any sympathy." (Male, Imam, Adıyaman, age 59).

"There can be problems when what we see and feel when we look at the flag differs." Female, Teacher, Diyarbakır, age 30).

"I prefer saying Turkey [not Turkish flag or Turkish state]." (Female, Teacher, Istanbul, age 24).

"I don't think the dead soldiers are martyrs. I think the concept is used under the name of Turkism." (Male, Teacher, Tatvan, age 47).

"They are martyrs if they are believers, they are not martyrs if this is the ideology of the state." (Male, Civil Servant, Van, age 40).

12.

Perception Of The Kurdish Issue

12.1.Equality

The idea of whether Turks and Kurds are equal before the state

| | TOTAL | Women | Men | POLITICAL VIEW | | | RELIGIOSITY | | | VOTING PREFERENCE | | |
				RIGHT	CENTER	LEFT	Low	Average	High	AKP	CHP	HDP
Equal	26%	29%	24%	40%	25%	11%	16%	28%	35%	51%	23%	9%
In the center	20%	21%	20%	26%	21%	13%	15%	25%	17%	26%	28%	13%
Not	54%	50%	57%	34%	53%	76%	69%	47%	48%	22%	49%	78%

Majority of the participants think that Kurds and Turks are not equal before the state. This opinion is shared by one-third of the rightists and three-quarters of the leftists. Similarly, while less than a quarter of AKP voters share that there is no equality, this rate is more than half for CHP voters and more than three quarters for HDP voters. Although the perception of inequality is higher in those with low religiosity, this rate is close to half among those who are highly religious.

Particularly in qualitative interviews, although a significant part of religious, rightist and AKP voter participants said that there was no equality in the past, but we can talk about equality today, these participants also think that there is an economic inequality in the regional sense, albeit not ethnically:

> *"I sometimes think it is not equal. The state tries to provide services everywhere, but sometimes we are treated as second-class citizens in the region" (Male, Imam, Urfa, age 36).*

> *"Kurds are viewed from a different perspective due to the past problems. For example, the same investments are not made in terms of economy" (Male, Contractor, Bingöl, age 42).*

However, most of the participants attribute the opinion that Turks and Kurds are not equal before the state, to a lack of identity and language rather than economy. The inequality perception justified in this context seems to be quite strong.

"Kurds and Turks do not have equal rights in the Republic of Turkey. All the rights given to Turks should also be given to Kurds in order for us to be equal" (Female, Civil Servant, Bingöl, age 45).

"It has never been equal, we see the practices. We should not forget what has been done in the past, albeit some things changed recently. Laws must change. In fact, the Turkist mentality must reach a reasonable level so that the laws can change" (Male, Teacher, Tatvan, age 47).

"As a Kurd, you can't reach anywhere, neither as a profession. We can say we are equal if we see Ruşen and Rojda as governors or district governors." (Male, Retired, Diyarbakır, age 62).

"I am an assimilated Kurd, I was born in Istanbul. I was in the 3rd grade of primary school, I was a stubborn child. We lived in Istanbul Paşabahçe, I was beaten badly because I am a Kurd and I reacted. I asked myself, "Why are they beating me just because I am Kurdish. I am their playground friend after all." I don't think I'm equal to them, my mother learned Turkish because she was afraid. Today they speak decent Turkish, they speak Turkish with me at home but speak Kurdish with women." (Male, Civil Servant, Van, age 40).

"No. I do not think they are equal because a Kurdish citizen cannot name their child in their mother tongue" (Female, Teacher, Diyarbakır, age 24).

"They are not equal in practice. Those who founded the state founded it on Turkism. The state does not recognize the Kurds. Its basic philosophy is Turkism." (Male, Retired Teacher, Adıyaman, age 70).

"[In order to ensure equality] nationalist Turks have to have reset their minds. They must know that they are not the only human beings and are not superior to anyone. Constitutional arrangements must be made, the Kurdish language must be protected with the constitution. The Kurds must be granted all kinds of rights." (Male, Civil Servant, Van, age 47).

"The right to education in mother tongue must be granted. There is a large population. There are 2-3 official languages in Sweden, Europe. Why is the language of a people with a large population in this country not among the official languages? Racist approaches towards Kurds should be severely punished" (Female, Accountant, Istanbul, age, 44).

12.2.Mother Tongue

| 13% | 61% | 17% | 9% |

■ Language of education should be the mother tongue only

■ Education should be bilingual: both in Turkish and the mother tongue

■ Language of education should be Turkish, mother tongue should be taught separately at school

■ Language of education should be Turkish, there is no need to teach mother tongue at school

	RIGHT	LEFT	REGION	WEST	AKP	CHP	HDP
Language of education should be the mother tongue only	13%	12%	12%	23%	11%	13%	15%
Education should be bilingual: both in Turkish and the mother tongue	49%	74%	63%	41%	47%	59%	72%
Language of education should be Turkish, mother tongue should be taught separately at school	26%	8%	18%	13%	26%	14%	9%
Language of education should be Turkish, there is no need to teach mother tongue at school	12%	5%	8%	22%	16%	13%	4%

	TOTAL	RIGHT	LEFT	AKP	CHP	HDP
Services should be provided in Kurdish in provinces with dense Kurdish population.	81,7%	78%	87%	74%	68%	89%

The most frequently emphasized problem and demand for the Kurdish issue by the participants is the mother tongue. It is seen that the most important issue regarding the perception of inequality, especially in qualitative interviews, is the mother tongue. In this respect, this issue stands out as the common demand of almost all Kurds with different views. Some participants think that Kurdish should be taught as the language of education and teaching while others think that it should be taught as an elective course. On the other hand, it is thought that this issue cannot be resolved unless the employment problem is resolved even if Kurdish becomes the language of education and teaching.

"[Kurds and Turks are] not [equal], of course. People who want to receive education in the mother tongue do not have this opportunity. The new generation is forgetting their mother tongue. After two generations, there will be no one who speaks Kurdish in the family." (Female, Accountant, Istanbul, age 44).

"I don't know because we cannot predict what the future will bring to us. The value attached to Turkish should also be attached to Kurdish as well. Then I can send my child for education. Otherwise I will send my child, he/she will receive education, but will be unemployed. I cannot do this due to economic concerns" (Male, Civil Servant, Van, age 47).

"It should be in Kurdish language. Children starting kindergarten cannot communicate with a Turkish teacher. There are schools that provide Syrian language education for Syrian children. But this cannot be done for Kurdish despite the considerable population. If this condition improves, people's perspectives towards the state will change." (Female, Teacher, Diyarbakır, age 24).

"Definitely, it should be in Kurdish. Just like a Laz learns Laz language, Kurdish children also need to learn Kurdish language. The official language in the region should be Kurdish, and Turkish should be used as the roof/umbrella language." (Male, Civil Servant, Van, age 40).

12.3.Solution Process and the Status of Kurds

Solution process should be reinitiated for the Kurdish issue	TOTAL	RIGHT	LEFT	AKP	CHP	HDP
	79,4%	74%	85%	73%	78%	85%

Participants refer to the solution process as a period when inequalities decreased, and both Kurds and Turkish society were "relieved". For this reason, support for the solution process turns into an attitude that cuts all participants horizontally, as is the case with the issue of mother tongue.

Those who think that there is a need for unity among Kurds who are citizens of different countries

	GENDER		POLITICAL VIEW			RELIGIOSITY			LOCATION		VOTING PREFERENCE		
TOTAL	Women	Men	RIGHT	CENTER	LEFT	Low	Average	High	REGION	WEST	AKP	CHP	HDP
42,6%	39%	46%	34%	35%	59%	49%	37%	46%	42%	50%	27%	42%	59%

On the other hand, participants also assess inequality in relation to political status. In the quantitative interviews, nearly half of the participants stated that there is a need for unity among Kurds living in different countries. This idea, supported by 60% of HDP voters and leftists, is shared by more than a quarter of AKP voters, a third of those who see themselves on the right, and nearly half of religious people.

Especially in qualitative interviews, the inadequacy of the current political status is argued by most of the participants. It is seen that different world views provided different answers to the questions asked about the status of the Kurds in these interviews. The responses given about whether the Kurds need a state or their legal status in Turkey are closely related to the views that the Kurds are not equal citizens in Turkey. Because a significant part of the participants who think that the Kurds are not seen as equal citizens by the state, also think that an important aspect of the Kurdish issue is the political status of the Kurds in Turkey. Except for a few participants who think that the current situation for the Kurds should be maintained, even those who think that there is not much of a problem regarding the Kurdish issue today think that local governments should be strengthened and provincial governors should be elected by the people. Therefore, it can be said that the majority of the participants expect a radical or moderate solution regarding the political status of the Kurds in Turkey.

"It should be. If the Kurds have a state, it means peace in the Middle East. The root of the problems experienced in Syria, Iraq and Turkey is the fact that the Kurds do not have a state. Because when the Kurds have a problem, they cannot find a state to which they can address. Kurdish population have a significant impact beyond the geography, therefore they should have a state" (Worker, Male, Van, age 35).

"The Kurds never established a state in the past, but I would like it to be. If a Kurdish state is to be established, I would like it to be established on the basis of Islam." (Male, Contractor, Bingöl, age 42).

"Yes, there should be. There are divided, fragmented Kurdish structures. There are assimilated Kurds. They need a status for the whole world to recognize them. Let them live their language and culture. I want a state to be established." (Female, Secretary, İzmir, age 45).

"There can be an autonomous administration. But I would like it to be linked to Ankara as well. It can also be a Federation" (Male, Retired, Diyarbakır, age 62).

"Republic of Turkey should switch to a federal ad. Republic of Turkey should be governed from 5 regions." (Male, Teacher, Urfa, age 36).

"My personal opinion is that local governments should be strengthened. Provincial governors should be elected by the people. The state should also protect them." (Male, Tradesman, Muş, age?).

"Local governments should be strengthened, provincial governors should be elected by the people, there should be some state systems, the state should not withdraw completely." (Male, Worker, Van, age 39).

13.

View On Politics

13.1.Political Party Preferences

We asked questions about the political preferences of both themselves and their families, along with the meanings that the participants attributed to the concepts of right and left. Thus, we aim to understand both the relationship between the political preferences of the participants and their right or left tendencies, and whether there is a continuity between their current political preferences and their families' political preferences.

In this context, there are parallels observed between the political preferences of the majority of the participants and the political preferences of their parents. From past to present, the voting preference of the parents and families of the participants appears to be mostly in favor of right/conservative parties such as Milli Görüş (National Vision) parties (RP, Fazilet) and ANAP/DYP or left-wing parties such as HADEP/DEHAP in the 1990s while it is predominantly AKP and Kurdish political parties after 2000s.

		TOTAL	2018 VOTING PREFERENCES		
			AKP	CHP	HDP
FAMILYS POLITICAL AFFINITY BEFORE 2000	**HEP / HADEP**	40%	10%	20%	70%
	Refah, Fazilet	22%	42%	11%	8%
	ANAP - DYP	18%	32%	12%	8%
	SHP, DSP, CHP	13%	6%	50%	11%
	MHP, BBP vb.	7%	11%	6%	3%

When we look at the approximate situation of the votes in the research region and their changes compared to 2018, it is seen that AKP and MHP lost votes while parties such as CHP, Deva and Gelecek increased their votes. HDP's vote is also partially decreasing, however, the loss in its general vote is less than 10%.

	2018	TODAY	DIFFERENCE
AKP	36,4%	31,6%	-4,8
CHP	9,2%	13,5%	4,3
MHP	6,0%	3,7%	-2,3
HDP	41,6%	38,6%	-3,0
İYİ Party	4,0%	4,6%	0,7
Saadet Party	1,0%	1,3%	0,3
Gelecek Party	0,0%	1,4%	1,4
Deva Party	0,0%	2,5%	2,5
Hüda Par	0,9%	0,9%	0,0
Memleket Party	0,0%	0,5%	0,5
Workers Party of Turkey (TİP))	0,0%	0,6%	0,6
Diğer	0,9%	0,7%	0,2

|		VOTING PREFERENCES IN 2018			
	AKP	CHP	HDP	Non-voting	New voter
AKP	84,0%	2,0%	1,5%	12,2%	17,9%
CHP	3,0%	85,0%	4,0%	11,7%	21,2%
MHP	1,3%	1,0%	0,2%	2,8%	0,0%
HDP	2,0%	3,1%	88,0%	16,2%	23,1%
İYİ Party	0,4%	1,9%	0,3%	3,1%	4,8%
Saadet Party	0,0%	0,0%	0,1%	3,8%	0,0%
Gelecek Party	1,6%	0,5%	0,5%	2,2%	1,7%
Deva Party	2,6%	1,1%	1,3%	3,9%	1,7%
Other	1,1%	3,7%	1,1%	4,1%	4,3%
Protest Vote	4,0%	1,7%	3,0%	40,0%	25,3%
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

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It seems that the AKP lost 16% of its votes and at least 11% of this point switched to the opposition. On the other hand, the votes transferred from CHP and HDP cannot balance AKP's loss of approximately 5 points. For those who did not vote in 2018 and will vote for the first time, AKP falls behind CHP. 4 out of 10 voters who did not vote tend to protest. This rate is around a quarter for first-time voters. This situation can be interpreted as even though the distanced voters changed their attitude in favor of the opposition, they did not mobilize sufficiently.

Half of the participants share that they do not have a second party other than their first preference. CHP and MHP seem to be advantageous as second parties. 40% of HDP supporters see CHP as their second party, and a similar number of AKP supporters see MHP as their second party.

Second parties of participants after their primary party

	TOTAL	AKP	CHP	HDP
AK Parti	1,5%	0%	1%	2%
CHP	15,6%	2%	0%	40%
MHP	12,8%	40%	0%	1%
HDP	4,2%	2%	20%	0%
İYİ Party	4,7%	2%	32%	3%
SAADET Party	1,6%	4%	0%	1%
GELECEK Party	1,1%	2%	1%	1%
DEVA Party	3,2%	6%	9%	3%
Other	2,9%	3%	8%	4%
Protest Vote	52,4%	39%	29%	45%

13.2.Affinity to Political Actors

Selahattin Demirtaş is the politician deemed closest by the participants. Demirtaş is also the only person with an average score above 3 on a scale of 1 to 5. Deniz Gezmiş follows him with 3 points. Erdoğan ranks third among living politicians, and seventh overall. Süleyman Soylu and Devlet Bahçeli are the politicians that the participants see the most distant from themselves.

	TOTAL	Women	Men	Religious	Right	Left	AK Parti	CHP	HDP
Selahattin Demirtaş	45%	44%	46%	35%	25%	71%	11%	44%	77%
Deniz Gezmiş	35%	32%	38%	30%	35%	54%	20%	50%	46%
Turgut Özal	32%	33%	32%	34%	42%	22%	41%	35%	28%
Atatürk	31%	29%	33%	31%	41%	33%	36%	68%	21%
Necmettin Erbakan	31%	29%	32%	38%	57%	15%	49%	30%	20%
Ekrem İmamoğlu	29%	27%	30%	22%	21%	40%	14%	64%	36%
Adanan Menderes	27%	31%	24%	32%	44%	16%	39%	27%	22%
Mansur Yavaş	27%	25%	29%	24%	28%	33%	20%	55%	30%
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	31%	32%	30%	46%	66%	12%	72%	6%	11%
Mesud Barzani	23%	23%	23%	20%	26%	22%	20%	15%	30%
Abdullah Gül	24%	25%	23%	29%	32%	20%	30%	27%	20%
Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu	20%	19%	22%	20%	23%	25%	13%	51%	23%
Süleyman Demirel	19%	18%	20%	21%	33%	15%	26%	29%	13%
Süleyman Soylu	24%	25%	23%	38%	56%	13%	43%	21%	3%
Devlet Bahçeli	20%	18%	21%	29%	49%	9%	36%	19%	1%

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Taking into consideration those who find themselves close to a politician on average or above, more than three-quarters of HDP voters, nearly half of CHP voters, and 11% of AKP voters find Demirtaş close. A quarter of those who position themselves on the right of the political scale and a third of those who are above-average religious also have a high level of affinity to Demirtaş. Demirtaş and Erdoğan have similar popularities in their own and each other's parties. 72% of AKP voters and 11% of HDP voters find Erdoğan close.

While closeness to Ekrem İmamoğlu and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is around 20% among religious and right-wing voters, 13-14% of AKP voters feel close to these actors.

Closeness to Atatürk is seen in one-fifth of HDP voters and one-third of AKP voters. For those who position themselves on the right, this affinity rises above 40%.

30% of HDP voters and 20% of AKP voters feel close to Massoud Barzani. This rate is 15% for CHP voters.

On the right of the political spectrum, affinity to Süleyman Soylu is more than half. This rate is 43% among AKP voters. Bahçeli, on the other hand, is considered close by about half of those who position themselves on the right and by a third of AKP voters.

13.3. Assessments on Erdoğan and Presidential Preferences

General average of the answers provided to the question of how well President Erdoğan performs his duties is found to be 4,3 out of 10. More than half of the participants think that Erdoğan performs his duties badly. The rate of those who think that he is doing well is less than one in five. 30% of those who position themselves on the right and 15% of AKP voters are not satisfied with the way Erdoğan is performing his duties.

How Erdoğan performs his Presidential duties	TOTAL	Women	Men	RIGHT	CENTER	LEFT	Religious	AKP	CHP	HDP
Bad	53,9%	50%	58%	37%	50%	77%	47%	15%	64%	79%
Average	29,2%	32%	27%	34%	38%	17%	24%	44%	33%	18%
Good	16,8%	18%	15%	30%	12%	6%	29%	41%	4%	3%

	TOTAL	Women	Men	RIGHT	CENTER	LEFT	Religious	AKP	CHP	HDP
I am an Erdoğan fan	15,5%	16%	15%	27%	12%	5%	18%	44%	5%	0%
I am not a fan, but very close	5,9%	5%	7%	10%	4%	2%	5%	12%	3%	2%
I am close, but there are aspects I criticize	10,0%	10%	10%	13%	14%	4%	14%	21%	6%	3%
I might be close, but the aspects I criticize outweigh	8,8%	12%	6%	11%	12%	4%	11%	10%	10%	4%
I am distant, but there are aspects I like	11,6%	11%	12%	9%	18%	9%	8%	6%	16%	12%
I am distant, the aspects I like are very few	21,4%	22%	20%	14%	25%	27%	20%	3%	28%	30%
I am totally anti-Erdoğan	26,8%	24%	30%	16%	14%	50%	23%	3%	32%	49%

15,5% of the participants are Erdoğan fans while more than a quarter are completely anti-Erdoğan. In total, the rate of those who are distant to Erdoğan is close to 60%. 12% of participants who voted for AKP in 2018 feel distant from Erdoğan, and a quarter of them have an anti-Erdoğan stance.

Admiration for Erdoğan is more than a quarter among right-leaning while it is 5% among left-leaning. Half of left-leaning and HDP voters are anti-Erdoğan. This stance is apparent in 16% of the right-wing voters.

According to their answers to the open-ended question, one-third of the participants want to see Selahattin Demirtaş, and more than one-fourth of them want to see Erdoğan as President. Ekrem İmamoğlu and Mansur Yavaş follow these two names.

In the case where the question is multiple choice, Demirtaş gets more votes than Erdoğan and İmamoğlu combined. While more than half of the right-wing voters vote for Erdoğan, İmamoğlu gets 11 and Demirtaş gets 23 points from right-wing voters. Among the religious, the situation is changing in favor of Demirtaş. More than a third of the religious voters tend towards Erdoğan, however, Demirtaş's vote is one point ahead in this group.

17% of 2018 AKP voters distanced themselves from Erdoğan. 9% of these voters are undecided/tend to boycott while the others are split between Demirtaş and İmamoğlu. 5% of CHP voters and 2% of HDP voters say they will vote for Erdoğan. An undecided/boycott tendency stands out with 11 points in CHP and 5 points in HDP.

	TOTAL	Women	Men	RIGHT	CENTER	LEFT	Religious	AKP	CHP	HDP
ERDOĞAN	29,1%	29%	29%	51%	23%	9%	38%	83%	5%	2%
İMAMOĞLU	10,5%	9%	11%	11%	10%	11%	7%	4%	71%	5%
DEMİRTAŞ	41,8%	39%	44%	23%	37%	66%	39%	3%	13%	89%
Protest Vote	18,6%	23%	15%	15%	30%	14%	17%	9%	11%	5%

In the options without Demirtaş, it is seen that a significant amount of Demirtaş's votes passed to İmamoğlu. In this case, İmamoğlu and Mansur Yavaş beat Erdoğan by 10 points and 1 point, respectively. Kılıçdaroğlu, on the other hand, lags behind Erdoğan by 1 point.

Protest Vote

ERDOĞAN	29.3%	30.80%	39.80% İMAMOĞLU
ERDOĞAN	29.6%	39.70%	30.70% YAVAŞ
ERDOĞAN	30%	40.70%	29.30% KILIÇDAOĞLU

14.

Conclusion

The overwhelming majority of the opinions produced or acquired about the Kurds in Turkey tend to consider the Kurds as a homogeneous, static and political society. Such an assessment makes the diversity of attitudes, values and worldviews of the Kurds within themselves, their changes and political or apolitical differences invisible. This research, which focuses on the diversities in the values, attitudes and ways of identity of the Kurds in Turkey, is primarily based on an objection to stereotypes such as these. Approaches that consider the Kurds as a monolithic community often place them on the left of the political spectrum. One of the aims of this research was to focus on left, right and central tendencies in order to depict the political diversity in the Kurds against this stereotype. Thus, our aim with this research is to present a scientific and objective alternative to stereotypes about Kurds in politics and civil society and the general public.

This research was conducted on a period between the local elections in 2019 and the general elections in 2023, if held on time. This period is when the Kurds turned into an effective power on the political scene, showed the ability to change the balances, and became the center of attention of politics. Therefore, the study also bears the aim to ensure more realistic recognition of the Kurdish society, which has become a focus of attention in terms of the political institution and civil society area and to help conduct politics through this recognition.

As indicated with the research findings, Kurds have similarities and differences with Turkish society, as well as differences within themselves. Various forms of sociality and political orientations of the Kurds, their cultural habits and everyday lives, emotional and public connections to Turkey, religious beliefs and practices, collective demands and expectations, perceptions of nationalism, the state and relevant issues, their approaches to gender, immigrants and the "other", and their views on politics have been the important topics of the research. Based on all these issues, the similarities, differences and changes of the Kurds both with the rest of Turkey and within themselves were tried to be understood. Although it is possible to position the majority of the Kurdish society on the right and left of the political spectrum, it is necessary to take into account that these positions are more flexible than the categorical right-left divisions, and there are categories such as "left on the right" and "right on the left". On the other hand, another significant majority positions itself "at the center" as a category outside these political tendencies. Again, some of those who positions themselves at the center affiliate Muslim identity with an alternative political view saying that "Muslims do not have leftist or rightist views!" while some think that the right-left scale cannot meet the given political diversity and that there are gray areas in this respect. Therefore, political positioning of the participants in this category requires a more comprehensive interpretation of the political spectrum and an approach that takes into consideration the diversity of gray areas. This political diversity also reinforces the fact that homogeneity, which is our point of objection, is a myth, and therefore it would be wrong to stereotypically assess the Kurds, who are a heterogeneous society. This diversity needs to be taken into account primarily by civil society actors and policy makers in Turkey and in the world.

On the other hand, Kurds have different tendencies not only politically but also in terms of religion. In this context, another misconception is that Kurdish society is a very religious society. The main problem of such interpretations is related to seeing the Kurdish society as a static society from a cultural point of view. However, Kurdish society has undergone a rapid transformation in terms of approach to religion, especially in the last 30 years. Kurdish socio-cultural field is an area where visible changes have taken place as a manifestation of both urbanization, education and general modernization processes and their own internal political dynamics starting from the 1980s. Although religion still maintains its central position in this field of change, it is evident that religiosity tends to weaken between generations from past to present. In this respect, young people show distinct differences from their predecessors. In addition, women's experiences also occupy a unique place regarding the changes in Kurdish society. In the Kurdish society, which is known to be based on a male-dominated structure from past to present, women are increasingly becoming visible as a subject in politics and daily life, especially in the family, and the gender perception of young generations is developing towards an egalitarian context as a manifestation of these changes.

In addition, together with previous studies, this study shows that the phenomenon of migration is an important factor influencing the experiences of Kurds and that a "more Turkish" Kurdishness is constructed, which is also shaped by "migrated generations". Daily and cultural habits, political tendencies, agendas, demands and identification forms of Kurds living in the west cities of Turkey and planning a future there are gradually changing. This situation differentiates the Kurds in the West from the Kurds in the Region. In this case, both the Kurds differ within themselves and also the tendency of the Kurds in the West to become a part of Turkey brings the Kurds closer to the Turkish society in general.

This study was carried out in order to understand the Kurds in Turkey from different perspectives and to make a positive contribution to Kurdish studies. We would like to thank once again our supporter Heinrich Böll Stiftung Association, the study team and everyone who contributed to make this study possible.

VALUES AND ATTITUDES
OF KURDS
2021